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Western Front: 1915 – 1917: Stalemate
Operations in 1917
1. Nivelle's
Offensive
2. Battle
of Arras
3. Battle
of Messines
4. Third
Battle of Ypres
5. French
Victories
6. Battle of Cambrai
Battle of Cambrai
Short Summary:
BATTLE OF CAMBRAI (Nov. 20 - Dec. 3, 1917). As a possible
solution to the breaking of the stabilized front, the British launched
a massed attack of almost 500 tanks at dawn on November 20. Cavalry
followed closely to exploit the hoped-for breakthrough. The attack gained
spectacular initial successes, but by nightfall the tanks and cavalry
had become stalled along the difficult St. Quentin Canal. For the next
few days bitter fighting took place for Bourlon Wood; by November 26,
the advance had progressed only to the line shown. On November 30, an
overwhelming German counterattack drove the British steadily back. By
December 3, they had stabilized their lines, retaining some ground gained
in the center, but losing an equal amount of their original holdings
to the south. This first massed tank attack had failed, but it indicated
great promise for the future.
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As the year 1917 drew to its end, Haig realized that
at most one more offensive would be possible before he and the French
faced the full flood of the German divisions set free by the Russo-German
armistice. By the end of October, he was doubtful whether even that
much would be possible. Between October 24 and November 11, Austro-German
forces won a brilliant victory over the Italians in the Battle of Caporetto
(now Kobarid). The rout ended on the Piave River after 11 Franco British
divisions had been sent to Italy from the western front, but before
they had been in action.
Meanwhile, Haig's problem was that he was still unsure
of how many troops he would have to send to Italy (actually, the British
contingent was reduced to 5 divisions, whereas the French sent the original
quota of 6). This anxiety was, however, mild by comparison with his
satisfaction that tanks were at last to be used as their creators had
foreseen, and that he could allot the Third Army of Gen. Sir Julian
H. G. Byng (later 1st Viscount Byng) 324 tanks, as against the 48 in
action at Arras. Moreover, owing to new artillery methods, especially
sound rangmg and flash spotting, every German battery could be pin-pointed,
a preliminary bombardment could be dispensed with, and complete surprise
could be achieved for the first time.
At 6:20 A.M. on November 20, the fire and the advance
of the tanks began simultaneously. By evening the advance exceeded three
miles, and it might have been far greater but for the one calamity of
the battle at Flesquieres, where a single German field battery knocked
out tank after tank as they breasted the rise, and the supporting infantry
could not force a way through the wire of the Hindenburg Line while
it remained uncut. The battle now resolved itself into a fight for the
height surmounted by Bourlon Wood, which was taken and retaken.
Ludendorff saw exactly what was required. He massed
his reinforcements on the flanks of the bulge between Banteux and Moeuvres
and directed Gen. Georg von der Marwitz, commanding the Second Army,
to eliminate it by convergent thrusts. Marwitz struck at 8:30 A.M. on
November 30, after a bombardment maintained all night and on the southern
flank won a great victory. The German infantry had never fought with
greater enthusiasm or tactical skill. Disdaining the heights which commanded
the valleys, it made use of these to paralyze the defense. The attack
not only smashed the British array on the new front, but captured the
original position farther south on a frontage of three miles. The Guards
Division recovered Gouzeaucourt, however, and brought the enemy's advance
to a halt.
The same tactics were employed on the northern flank,
but on more open ground with better observation they did not meet the
demands of the situation. The guns were firing over open sights, shooting
the successive waves to fragments, and when the accompanying batteries
strove to unlimber, they laid out the horses so that the guns were thenceforth
stationary. Prince Rupert and Marwitz called off the battle on the night
of December 1. Between December 4 and 7, Haig had to yield a few more
of his gains in order to obtain a defensible front based on the Hindenburg
Line. His losses totaled 43,000 men, including 6,000 prisoners taken
on the first day of the counteroffensive; those of the Germans, 41,000
men, including 11,000 prisoners. The British public, which had listened
to the premature ringing of church bells, was bitterly disappointed
by the reversal of fortunes and staggered by the loss of guns: 158,
as contrasted with 138 taken from the Germans.
The most interesting feature of Cambrai was its significance
for the future. The tactics and strategy of World War II were first
developed in this battle, and the victories of 1918, beginning with
the reduction of the Amiens salient on August 8-September 3, depended
on it to an equal extent.
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