Eastern Front
War Plans
Short Summary:
WAR PLANS; EASTERN FRONT. Germany's plan provided for
its Eighth Army to hold the Russians until France had been defeated;
then full German power would be turned against Russia. Russia's plans
were based on two contingencies: an offensive plan, if Germany's main
effort was directed against France; and a defensive plan, if the effort
was directed against Russia. The only difference in troop dispositions
was the location of the Fourth Army. Similarly, Austria-Hungary provided
for war against Serbia alone and for war against both Russia and Serbia.
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The initial events on the eastern front were dominated
by German strategy in the west. Germany had long prepared for a war
on two fronts. In 1890, Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke had devised
a plan to defend the western front and throw Germany's main strength
against Russia before concentrating on the defeat of France. This strategy
was subsequently reversed by Count Alfred von Schlieffen. According
to the celebrated Schlieffen Plan, Germany's entire strength was to
be directed against France, leaving virtually no forces in the east.
The French armies were to be captured or destroyed within six weeks,
and the troops then shifted to the eastern front for a full-scale drive
against Russia.
This plan assumed that Russian mobilization would be
slow, and that it would therefore be safe initially to leave German
territory in the east undefended. By 1913, however, it was clear that
this premise was no longer valid, for Russia was enlarging and improving
her army and building military railways. Col. Gen. Helmuth von Moltke,
nephew of the field marshal, therefore modified the Schlieffen Plan.
He realized that Russia was bound by treaty to take the part of France
and would mobilize rapidly from the first sign of hostilities. Since
Austria-Hungary would remain on the defensive if she were not assisted
by Germany, the net effect of the Schlieffen Plan would be to give Russia
complete freedom of action to occupy East Prussia and Galicia and march
toward Berlin. For these reasons, Moltke decided to station an army
in East Prussia and support it with strong garrisons at Germany's eastern
fortresses. As will be seen, Moltke's modifications of the Schlieffen
Plan played a key role in the repulse of the initial Russian offensive
and in the German victory in the campaign around Tannenberg (now Stebark).
Austria-Hungary and Russia each had two war plans, One
Austrian plan assumed a war with Serbia alone, which would be invaded
by three armies, while the other three Austrian armies guarded the Russian
front in Galicia. The second plan assumed a war with both Serbia and
Russia. In this case, four armies would be thrown into battle against
Russia, and two would invade Serbia. Of the Russian plans, one was wholly
defensive and assumed that Germany would make her first major effort
in the east. The army groups in the north and south would retreat eastward
until a counteroffensive could be organized. The second plan, which
was actually effected, was offensive. It envisaged the main German attack
against France and provided for Russian drives against East Prussia
and Galicia in order to safeguard both flanks of the Polish salient
in preparation for an invasion of Silesia. When war was declared in
August 1914, the French, fearing an all-out German drive in the west,
urged an early Russian offensive to divert German forces to the east.
Much to their regret, the Russians succumbed to their ally's insistence.
