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Eastern Front
Tannenberg Campaign
Short Summary:
TANNENBERG CAMPAIGN (Aug. 17-29, 1914). Germany having
made its main effort against France, Russia immediately launched its
offensive against both East Prussia and Austria in accordance with its
agreement with the French, although its forces were only partially mobilized.
The First Army advanced from the east and engaged elements of the German
Eighth Army at Stalluponen and Gumbinnen without material results. Meanwhile,
the Second Army entered East Prussia from the south to trap the German
Eighth Army. In a brilliant operation the Germans shifted front to engage
the Second Army, encircled three Russian corps, and virtually destroyed
the Second Army. The Russian First Army, which had made a halfhearted
effort to assist the Second, then turned about and withdrew.
-------------------------------
Russian mobilization proceeded rapidly after the outbreak
of war and was accompanied by great enthusiasm. The people considered
the struggle a defensive war against German imperialists, who had long
threatened Russia and exploited her economically. By mid-August the
commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, and the chief of staff, Gen.
Nicholas Yanushkevich, had nearly 2 million men on the front line. Although
this was only a third of the potential fighting force, and although
logistical support for an offensive was lacking, the Russians heeded
the pleas of their French ally and ordered converging attacks to start
on August 13 from the east and southeast against East Prussia. Gen.
Paul Rennenkampf's First Army and Gen. Alexander Samsonov's Second Army,
both under the over-all command of Gen. Ivan Zhilinsky at Warsaw, immediately
moved their troops into advance positions for the attack. Rennenkampf
crossed the border on August 17, five days before Samsonov was scheduled
to do so. The plan was to draw German forces north and east, enabling
Samsonov's army to envelop their rear. This strategy failed because
of the lack of adequate information about German troop dispositions,
faulty liaison, and the fact that Rennenkampf did not carry out Zhilinsky's
orders to weight his north flank so as to drive the German garrison
from Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad).
At his headquarters in Allenstein the German eastern
front commander, Col. Gen. Max von Prittwitz, ordered three corps to
the Angerapp (Wegorapa) River area, to guard against invasion from the
east, and his fourth corps to the Tannenberg area, to guard the southern
border. Although he was authorized by the high command to withdraw to
the Vistula if necessary, he knew that he was expected to use the terrain
and railroads to organize a defense against anticipated successive Russian
blows. By means of spies and intercepted radio messages, which the Russians
habitually sent uncoded, Prittwitz had obtained information concerning
Zhilinsky's battle orders. What he did not know was that the headstrong
commander of his 1st Corps, Gen. Hermann von Francois, had moved forward
independently to Stalluponen (now Nesterov) on the border, where he
was prepared to fight to prevent Russian vioration of Prussia's "sacred
soil." When a Russian corps approached, Francois counterattacked,
inflicting heavy casualties on the invaders. Tactically, his action
was sound, but it upset Prittwitz' carefully planned strategy. Time
was important to the German commander, for he had only five days to
defeat Rennenkampf before he would have to turn his armies south to
stop Samsonov's anticipated attack. Prittwitz therefore planned to lure
Rennenkampf westward into a decisive battle on the Angerapp River. Francois'
counterattack delayed the Russian advance to the contemplated major
battlefield.
Fortunately for the Germans, Rennenkampf did not appreciate
the danger to his forces. He continued his advance for two days, approaching
but not reaching the Angerapp. By this time, Francois had consolidated
his forces at their designated position around Gumbinnen (now Gusev),
but he urged Prittwitz to order an immediate counteroffensive. Over
the objections of his brilliant operations officer, Lt. Col. (later
Maj. Gen.) Max Hoffmann, who wanted time to bring up two corps entrenched
west of the river, Prittwitz gave in and ordered a full-scale attack
for August 20.
As Hoffmann feared, the German attack was made piecemeal
and achieved little success. Along the greater part of the front the
German troops were repulsed. The result was a stalemate, but Prittwitz
needed a decisive victory. He had to make up his mind whether to resume
the attack or to withdraw toward the Vistula. Later on August 20, news
was received at his headquarters in Allenstein that Samsonov's Second
Army had already entered East Prussia. Prittwitz thereupon telephoned
Moltke that he would withdraw to the Vistula, but that he would need
reinforcements to hold the Russians eye n there. Moltke's immediate
reaction was to relieve Prittwitz of his command, and by August 23 his
successor, Gen. (later Field Marshal) Paul von Hindenburg, called from
retirement, reached the front with his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Erich
F. W. Ludendorff, who had already distinguished himself in the fighting
on the western front.
While Hindenburg and Ludendorff were to be credited with reversing the
tide of battle and achieving a German victory at Tannenberg, Hoffmann
actually developed a new strategic plan before they arrived at the front.
Between August 20 and 23, he moved a division and a corps from the front
against Rennenkampf to face Samsonov's advancing Second Army in the
south, which was threatening to cut off the German troops by a drive
northwestward to the Gulf of Danzig. Two additional German corps were
moving westward and were ready to turn south if Rennenkampf did not
press his advance.
Hoffmann's plan was approved by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
The German forces were now concentrated against Samsonov's slow-moving
offensive, with only a cavalry division and a brigade left in the north
to delay Rennenkampf. The shift was a daring maneuver, but the Germans
could well afford it. Inadequate railroads and roads, virtually nonexistent
logistical support, and dissension between Zhilinsky and Samsonov slowed
the Russian advance. These difficulties, as well as the day-to-day tactics
of the Russians, were well known to the Germans, because they were broadcast
in plain language by Zhilinsky's headquarters and by Rennenkampf and
Samsonov in the field. The lack of trained code and communications personnel
proved a major handicap to the Russians.
On August 24, the middle of -Samsonov's line met entrenched
German opposition at Frankenau, and heavy fighting broke out that lasted
all day. Since Samsonov still thought the Germans were in flight to
the west, however, it was announced on his radio that August 25 would
be a day of rest.
The Germans did not rest. Assured that they would have
time to concentrate their strength against Samsonov before Rennenkampf
was able to intervene, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Hoffmann set their
trap. The 20th Corps at Frankenau was withdrawn northwestward and dug
in at Tannenberg. To the south garrisons transported from Konigsberg
and the Vistula prepared a breakthrough at Usdau (,now Uzdowa) and at
Bischof stein (now Bisztynek), to the northeast of Allenstein, German
forces diverted from the front against Rennenkampf were detrained to
strike a decisive blow at the Russian rear. On August 26, Francois'
1st Corps, which had been moved south, took Seeben. On the same day,
the Russian 6th Corps was routed by the German 17th and 1st Reserve
Corps just north of Bischofsburg (now Biskupiec), and the envelopment
of Samsonov's northern flank began. The Russian 6th Corps escaped across
the border south of Ortelsburg (now Szczytno ), as did their 1st Corps
via Mlawa; but the three central corps (13th, 15th, and 23d) were threatened
with encirclement by the four German corps.
Samsonov does not seem to have realized the full measure
of the disaster until the morning of August 29, when the Russian retreat
had become general. During the day the Germans forced the three fleeing
Russian corps into a pocket that constantly grew smaller. On August
30 and 31, the Russians tried to break through Francois' lines, but
they succeeded only in retaking Neidenburg (now Nidzica), which they
had to evacuate again the following day. All escape routes were now
tightly sealed. The Germans captured 125,000 men and 500 guns in the
Tannenberg pocket, whereas their own losses for the whole campaign totaled
between 10,000 and 15,000 men. There are no accurate figures on the
Russians killed and wounded, but the losses were staggering. Defeated
and despondent, Samsonov committed suicide.
The Tannenberg campaign thus ended in a great German
victory. Rennenkampf's army in the north was still intact, however,
and Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Hoffmann now made plans to dispose of
these remaining Russian invaders.
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