Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision
German Drives of 1918
Though surprise was an essential element in the German
scheme, Haig had developed a fair estimate of Ludendorff's plan. Petain,
however, had concluded that the attack would come in his sector, in
the Reims area. The British and French each attempted to organize a
deep defensive zone, but because of manpower shortages and the negligence
of subordinate leaders neither zone was completed in time.
Ludendorff expected to break the deadlock on the western
front by the large-scale application of the new Hutier tactics, which
had been developed by Gen. Oskar von Hutier and his staff at Riga and
had been tested successfully at Caporetto. These tactics made radical
changes in the employment of artillery and infantry. Instead of a lengthy
bombardment designed to obliterate the defenses within a limited zone,
such as the 19-day shelling in the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917, only
a short preparation was fired. It included a high proportion of gas
and smoke shells and was designed to put out of action for a short period
the enemy gun positions, headquarters, machine guns, observation posts,
and trenches. After this preliminary bombardment, the artillery began
to fire a rolling barrage that started on the enemy front line and moved
forward at a predetermined rate. The rate varied with the terrain and
the opposition expected, but was usually one kilometer per hour. The
infantry followed the rolling barrage as closely as possible. The advance
of each unit was planned in great detail by higher headquarters so as
to infiltrate between known hostile centers of resistance. When the
barrage reached the limit of its range, full control of the various
units reverted to the regimental and battalion commanders, and the troops
advanced as fast and as far as possible in a given general direction,
no objectives being specified. When strong resistance was met, leading
units bypassed it and • moved speedily ahead, disregarding the
security of their flanks and leaving the reduction of resistance to
follow-up units. Each assault battalion had its own light artillery;
infantry troops were formed into small battle groups, each of which
was built around the light machine gun (formerly the bulwark of defense
but now considered by the Germans the principal infantry weapon in the
attack).
The new tactics demanded exceptional standards of training and physical
fitness, especially on the part of the infantry. The operations at Riga
and Caporetto had been conducted on a moderate scale against enemies
of low morale; . the contemplated Somme operations were to be on a gigantic
scale and would require dozens of highly effective shock divisions.
These were pulled out of the line early, filled with selected men at
the expense of the other divisions, and extensively trained. Since the
Germans had few tanks, this weapon was to play little part in the attack,
but special air units were formed to provide low-level bombing and strafing
in support of the ground attack.
