War Declared:
The Austrian Ultimatum and the Role of Germany

The Austro-Hungarian government quickly decided that the heaven-sent opportunity for a reckoning with Serbia was not to be lost. Inasmuch as action against Serbia might lead to the intervention of Russia, however, the cabinet of Vienna wished to know what Germany was prepared to do in such a situation. Although the German General Staff had declared in 1909 that Russian intervention to help Serbia would cause Germany to mobilize (in German terminology, this step was the prelude to war), the German government had steadily restrained the war party in Vienna during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Furthermore, the German emperor, William II, was suspected of being partial to Serbia. In order to ascertain the state of mind in Berlin, Emperor Francis Joseph I therefore wrote a letter to William, stating that Austria-Hungary must aim at the "isolation and diminution of Serbia," which must be "eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans." The AustroHungarian foreign minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold, drew up a long memorandum which urged that Bulgaria, Serbia's bitter enemy, be admitted into the Triple Alliance, and stated that it was "imperative" for the monarchy to take strong action against Serbia. What action was contemplated was explained orally by a special emissary sent from Vienna to Berlin, Count Alexander von Hoyos, who said that the plan was to "march into Serbia" without any warning and then to partition it between AustriaHungary, Albania, and Bulgaria.

Only two weeks before, the German chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, had said that, in the event of a new crisis arising in the Balkans, "whether . it would come to a general European conflagration would depend exclusively on the attitude of Germany and England." When Hoyos appeared in Berlin on July 5, however, this caution was forgotten. The Austrian plan to invade and partition Serbia was cordially received by the German emperor and the German government, and immediate action was urged on the Austro-Hungarian government. Because a royal personage had been killed, William II believed (so he asserted) that Czar Nicholas II would not go to the help of Serbia, but if he did so, Germany was ready to support Austria and wage war against Russia and France. This decision by William revealed at its worst the personal rule of the emperor, who did not consult his chancellor or his military advisers; he "told" them what he had done and left them to face the consequences; and they lacked the power, or the will, to reverse his decision. It is worth noting - that the German embassy in ,Russia was not asked whether the emperor's interpretation of the czar's state of mind was correct. Seldom if ever was a decision of the highest importance reached with more haste and recklessness. William and Bethmann Hollweg accepted the risk of war with unbelievable nonchalance; it was they who put the system of European alliances to the test.

The decision was not a matter of Germany's putting its head into a noose (as was sometimes asserted) and then being strangled; both emperor and chancellor had been informed of the Austro Hungarian plans and knew what they were supporting. Their assumption that Britain would remain neutral in a European war was contrary to what their ambassador in London had been saying for 18 months. The German General Staff was confident that Germany and Austria Hungary could defeat Russia and France; it assumed that war was inevitable and welcomed the prospect, for victory would be easier in 1914 than in 1917, when French and Russian military reorganization would be completed. It was not alarmed by the possibility of British intervention, for it expected that such intervention would be delayed, or that, if it came immediately, the small British Army would be overwhelmed by the German legions advancing through Belgium and France. Some conservative circles in Germany ( Bethmann-Hollweg mentions this) regarded war as a good method of dealing with the menace of socialism, which seemed to be steadily increasing. The idea of consulting the elected representatives of the German people in the Reichstag apparently occurred to no one.

The foreign policy of Germany had long ' vacillated between - east and west. From 1890 'to 1914 (that is, from the dismissal of Prince Otto von Bismarck as chancellor to the outbreak of war), the German government pursued a policy of expansion in both directions. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Navy League considered Britain the enemy- and advanced the building of the fleet, although the more they built the more they drove Britain into the arms of France and Russia. To the General Staff, France was the eternal enemy, and the army therefore was steadily expanded. Businessmen were divided, some looking to Africa and the colonial empires of Britain and France, while others preferred the Middle East, where the Baghdad Railway was the symbol and instrument of German expansion. The emperor and his chancellors never made up their minds where the fundamental interest of Germany lay; they acted as ii they thought that Germany was strong enough to move both east and west. In 1914 they were seriously concerned about the future of Austria-Hungary, their one reliable ally, and they persuaded themselves that only a military expedition against Serbia could stop the decay of the Habsburg empire even though the German ambassador in Vienna was highly skeptical about its possibility - of survival. The reason officially offered by the German government for its action was the necessity of aiding its hardpressed ally. The decision to act thus, in the calculation that Britain would remain neutral, may be interpreted as meaning that the long vacillation had been ended at least temporarily by a decision to go east.

The Austro-Hungarian government was now free to act, but the opposition of Count Is-Ivan Tisza, the Hungarian premier, forced Berchtold to abandon his plan to march into Serbia, and a Council of Ministers held on July 7 decided on a 48-hour ultimatum, which theoretically would offer Serbia a chance to submit. Actually, seven supposedly unacceptable demands were incorporated in the note so as to ensure the rejection of the ultimatum and open the way to military action. As the minutes of the meeting reveal, the treatment intended for Serbia included "rectifications of frontier" for the benefit of Austria-Hungary, while other parts of its territory were to be allotted to Bulgaria - and Albania; what was left of Serbia was to be attached to the monarchy by a military convention to be signed by a new dynasty. These designs were naturally not mentioned when the Austro-Hungarian government later declared to the other powers that it did not intend to take Serbian territory for itself.

The ultimatum, probably the most formidable document which had yet been addressed by one independent state to another, was presented to the Serbian government on July 23. It contained 10 demands, the most important of which required Serbia to admit Austrian officials in order to suppress agitation against the Dual Monarchy and to take action against the persons involved in the murder at Sarajevo. Outside of AustriaHungary and Germany the note was regarded as a monstrous document which no independent state could accept. To the complete surprise and intense annoyance of Vienna, the Serbian reply, delivered on July 25 a few minutes before the expiry of the ultimatum, was conciliatory and to a large extent appeared to accept the Austrian demands, as was later stated by both the German emperor and the German chancellor. Nevertheless, the Austrian minister, after a cursory reading of the document, broke off diplomatic relations and left Belgrade; later in the day, partial mobilization of the Austrian Army was ordered. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbiathe fateful decision from which all subsequent troubles derived. The military chiefs wished to wait until mobilization had been completed, but strong German pressure forced immediate action, which began with the bombardment of Belgrade on July 29.