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War Declared:
The Austrian Ultimatum and the Role of Germany
The Austro-Hungarian government quickly decided that the
heaven-sent opportunity for a reckoning with Serbia was not to be lost.
Inasmuch as action against Serbia might lead to the intervention of Russia,
however, the cabinet of Vienna wished to know what Germany was prepared
to do in such a situation. Although the German General Staff had declared
in 1909 that Russian intervention to help Serbia would cause Germany to
mobilize (in German terminology, this step was the prelude to war), the
German government had steadily restrained the war party in Vienna during
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Furthermore, the German emperor, William
II, was suspected of being partial to Serbia. In order to ascertain the
state of mind in Berlin, Emperor Francis Joseph I therefore wrote a letter
to William, stating that Austria-Hungary must aim at the "isolation
and diminution of Serbia," which must be "eliminated as a political
factor in the Balkans." The AustroHungarian foreign minister, Count
Leopold von Berchtold, drew up a long memorandum which urged that Bulgaria,
Serbia's bitter enemy, be admitted into the Triple Alliance, and stated
that it was "imperative" for the monarchy to take strong action
against Serbia. What action was contemplated was explained orally by a
special emissary sent from Vienna to Berlin, Count Alexander von Hoyos,
who said that the plan was to "march into Serbia" without any
warning and then to partition it between AustriaHungary, Albania, and
Bulgaria.
Only two weeks before, the German chancellor, Theobald
von Bethmann-Hollweg, had said that, in the event of a new crisis arising
in the Balkans, "whether . it would come to a general European conflagration
would depend exclusively on the attitude of Germany and England."
When Hoyos appeared in Berlin on July 5, however, this caution was forgotten.
The Austrian plan to invade and partition Serbia was cordially received
by the German emperor and the German government, and immediate action
was urged on the Austro-Hungarian government. Because a royal personage
had been killed, William II believed (so he asserted) that Czar Nicholas
II would not go to the help of Serbia, but if he did so, Germany was ready
to support Austria and wage war against Russia and France. This decision
by William revealed at its worst the personal rule of the emperor, who
did not consult his chancellor or his military advisers; he "told"
them what he had done and left them to face the consequences; and they
lacked the power, or the will, to reverse his decision. It is worth noting
- that the German embassy in ,Russia was not asked whether the emperor's
interpretation of the czar's state of mind was correct. Seldom if ever
was a decision of the highest importance reached with more haste and recklessness.
William and Bethmann Hollweg accepted the risk of war with unbelievable
nonchalance; it was they who put the system of European alliances to the
test.
The decision was not a matter of Germany's putting its
head into a noose (as was sometimes asserted) and then being strangled;
both emperor and chancellor had been informed of the Austro Hungarian
plans and knew what they were supporting. Their assumption that Britain
would remain neutral in a European war was contrary to what their ambassador
in London had been saying for 18 months. The German General Staff was
confident that Germany and Austria Hungary could defeat Russia and France;
it assumed that war was inevitable and welcomed the prospect, for victory
would be easier in 1914 than in 1917, when French and Russian military
reorganization would be completed. It was not alarmed by the possibility
of British intervention, for it expected that such intervention would
be delayed, or that, if it came immediately, the small British Army would
be overwhelmed by the German legions advancing through Belgium and France.
Some conservative circles in Germany ( Bethmann-Hollweg mentions this)
regarded war as a good method of dealing with the menace of socialism,
which seemed to be steadily increasing. The idea of consulting the elected
representatives of the German people in the Reichstag apparently occurred
to no one.
The foreign policy of Germany had long ' vacillated between
- east and west. From 1890 'to 1914 (that is, from the dismissal of Prince
Otto von Bismarck as chancellor to the outbreak of war), the German government
pursued a policy of expansion in both directions. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
and the Navy League considered Britain the enemy- and advanced the building
of the fleet, although the more they built the more they drove Britain
into the arms of France and Russia. To the General Staff, France was the
eternal enemy, and the army therefore was steadily expanded. Businessmen
were divided, some looking to Africa and the colonial empires of Britain
and France, while others preferred the Middle East, where the Baghdad
Railway was the symbol and instrument of German expansion. The emperor
and his chancellors never made up their minds where the fundamental interest
of Germany lay; they acted as ii they thought that Germany was strong
enough to move both east and west. In 1914 they were seriously concerned
about the future of Austria-Hungary, their one reliable ally, and they
persuaded themselves that only a military expedition against Serbia could
stop the decay of the Habsburg empire even though the German ambassador
in Vienna was highly skeptical about its possibility - of survival. The
reason officially offered by the German government for its action was
the necessity of aiding its hardpressed ally. The decision to act thus,
in the calculation that Britain would remain neutral, may be interpreted
as meaning that the long vacillation had been ended at least temporarily
by a decision to go east.
The Austro-Hungarian government was now free to act, but
the opposition of Count Is-Ivan Tisza, the Hungarian premier, forced Berchtold
to abandon his plan to march into Serbia, and a Council of Ministers held
on July 7 decided on a 48-hour ultimatum, which theoretically would offer
Serbia a chance to submit. Actually, seven supposedly unacceptable demands
were incorporated in the note so as to ensure the rejection of the ultimatum
and open the way to military action. As the minutes of the meeting reveal,
the treatment intended for Serbia included "rectifications of frontier"
for the benefit of Austria-Hungary, while other parts of its territory
were to be allotted to Bulgaria - and Albania; what was left of Serbia
was to be attached to the monarchy by a military convention to be signed
by a new dynasty. These designs were naturally not mentioned when the
Austro-Hungarian government later declared to the other powers that it
did not intend to take Serbian territory for itself.
The ultimatum, probably the most formidable document which
had yet been addressed by one independent state to another, was presented
to the Serbian government on July 23. It contained 10 demands, the most
important of which required Serbia to admit Austrian officials in order
to suppress agitation against the Dual Monarchy and to take action against
the persons involved in the murder at Sarajevo. Outside of AustriaHungary
and Germany the note was regarded as a monstrous document which no independent
state could accept. To the complete surprise and intense annoyance of
Vienna, the Serbian reply, delivered on July 25 a few minutes before the
expiry of the ultimatum, was conciliatory and to a large extent appeared
to accept the Austrian demands, as was later stated by both the German
emperor and the German chancellor. Nevertheless, the Austrian minister,
after a cursory reading of the document, broke off diplomatic relations
and left Belgrade; later in the day, partial mobilization of the Austrian
Army was ordered. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary
declared war against Serbiathe fateful decision from which all subsequent
troubles derived. The military chiefs wished to wait until mobilization
had been completed, but strong German pressure forced immediate action,
which began with the bombardment of Belgrade on July 29.
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