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War Declared:
The Roles of France, Britain, and Italy
Although the German General Staff planned to begin the
war with an attack on France, Germany had no dispute with that country
in 1914. In order to have an excuse for such an attack, the General Staff
declared the Russian mobilization a casus belli, and France was asked
if it, as the ally of Russia, would remain neutral. If France replied
in the negative, as was expected, Germany would have a justification for
making an attack. But events did not follow that course.
Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, which allowed
the Russian government to say that it had been attacked when it was ready
and eager to negotiate. According to the FrancoRussian alliance, the German
attack on Russia required France to attack Germany, but the French government,
in reply to the German demand for neutrality, said on August 1 that it
would consult its interests, an answer explained by the determination
of the government not to appear as an aggressor. The French reply did
not stop the German armies from invading France; and on August 3, Germany
declared war on France, alleging untruthfully that French planes had bombarded
Nurnberg. Thus France as well as Russia appeared to be the victim of brutal
aggression, a circumstance of great value in consolidating sentiment at
home and winning help abroad.
France's part in the crisis of 1914 was almost automatic.
While it had no direct interest in Serbia, it was the ally of Russia,
and if it did not stand by that country, the alliance would be broken
and France would be left isolated, possibly to face a repetition of the
German challenges of 1905 and 1911. At the moment when the Austrian ultimatum
was presented in Belgrade, President Raymond Poincare and Premier Rene
Viviani were paying a state visit to Russia, and they gave the czar and
his ministers the promise that France would support Russia in opposing
Austria-Hungary and Germany, a promise that certainly strengthened the
resolution of Sazonov. Later, after the two Frenchmen had returned to
Paris, the French government urged its ally to do nothing that would provide
Germany with an excuse for war, but it did not object to any action taken
by Russia. This attitude was so firmly supported by all shades of French
public opinion that the government did not feel it necessary to reveal
the terms of the Russian alliance. Thus both Germany and France supported
their allies on an issue not of direct concern to themselves-Serbia; and
so an Austro Serbian quarrel became transformed, in the interest of the
balance of power and by the operation of the system of alliances, into
a general European war.
The role of Great Britain, on the other hand, was anything
but automatic. The crisis found the Liberal government facing the prospect
both of a general strike in England and of a civil war in Ireland over
the question of home rule, possibilities which may have contributed to
convince the German government that Britain would remain neutral. Actually,
as soon as the European situation became ominous, the idea of a general
strike faded away and the Irish controversy was adjourned, both Irish
parties supporting the government in its efforts for peace. Sir Edward
Grey, the foreign secretary, made various proposals for delay,- discussion
(by a conference of ambassadors in London meeting with himself), and compromise;
all were rejected by Austria Hungary and Germany.
The British government was asked by Germany to accept
the principle that the AustroSerbian conflict should be localized, with
Britain proclaiming its neutrality, and by Russia and France to declare
its solidarity with them as the only means of restraining Germany from
war. Grey, along with the prime minister, Herbert Henry Asquith (later
1st earl of Oxford and Asquith), and some other members of the cabinet,
notably Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, believed
that Russia could not be expected to stand aside and abandon Serbia. In
the interest of future relations between Britain and Russia, Grey accordingly
refused to exert pressure on the latter to do so or to advise against
Russian mobilization. These cabinet members also believed that an Austro-German
victory in the coming struggle would establish an ascendancy of Germany
in Europe that would be dangerous for Britain. On the other hand, they
could not announce British solidarity with Russia and France because at
the beginning of the crisis a majority of the cabinet opposed British
participation in the war, and this view was shared by most of their supporters
in Parliament and by the country at large. At the time, even the military
conversations of 1906 and the notes exchanged with France in 1912 were
still secret.
Grey therefore had to conduct his policy, not according
to his convictions of what the interests of Britain required, but in the
light of what public opinion would support. He privately told the German
ambassador that, in the event of war, Britain would be drawn in, and it
was this statement which led the German government to modify its stand,
but he apparently did not inform the cabinet of what he had done. It was
not until Germany had declared war on Russia and had sent an ultimatum
to France that, on August 2, Britain promised the latter that it would
help defend the northern French coast against German attack. Even this
promise was made dependent on the approval of Parliament and could be
given only because the Conservative opposition agreed to support it. Since
Germany had promised not to attack the French coast, the British promise
would probably not have been put to the test if the former had not violated
the neutrality of Belgium.
This reversed the situation immediately; for the German
action convinced the cabinet, Par liament, and the country that it was
necessary for Britain to enter the conflict, which it did with a declaration
of war on Germany on August 4. Grey was later criticized for not making
clear to Germany much earlier than he did that the violation of Belgian
neutrality would be a casus belli for Britain. In all probability, however,
this would have been to no avail. The German General Staff had only one
plan for fighting the war, a plan which involved going through Belgium;
Moltke, being confident that he could deal with a British army, desired
rather than feared British intervention, and he could not have improvised
a new plan on the spur of the moment. It was true, as Germans often asserted
that for Grey the German action against Belgium was not the reason he
wished Britain to participate in the war, which he urged on general grounds,
but without the Belgian issue the British government probably could not
have induced the British people to go to war in August 1914.
Ever since that time, the question has been debated whether
a clear-cut declaration of British solidarity with France and Russia would
have prevented the war, but there is no agreement among the publicists,
diplomats, and historians who have written on the subject. All that can
safely be said is that Grey thought it impossible to make such a declaration
and never proposed it to the cabinet. (Mindful of this controversy, the
British government of 1939 did inform Germany that it would go to the
help of Poland, but this did not stop Adolf Hitler from attacking that
country.)
Italy, the sixth great European power, though the ally
of Austria-Hungary, disapproved of the latter's actions from the start.
If Italy's own struggle with Austria was any guide, Habsburg power probably
could not suppress the Yugoslav national movement by force, but if it
did succeed in doing so, Italian interests in the Adriatic would be affected.
In addition, Italy did not wish to expose its long coastline to the British
Fleet. The Italian government took advantage of the failure of Austria,
contrary to Article 7 of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, to notify
its ally in advance of its projected action and to settle the matter of
compensation. On August 3, it declared that Austria and Germany were waging
a war of aggression and proclaimed its neutrality; this action was of
immense importance to France, which was enabled to withdraw its troops
from the Italian frontier and send them against Germany.
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