WW1 POSTERS

Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision

a. GERMAN DRIVES OF 1918
b. REDUCTION OF THE GERMAN SALIENTS
c. ALLIED FINAL OFFENSIVE
d. GENERAL COMMENTARY

At the beginning of 1918 the Allied situation was critical. Though Gen. (later Marshal) Philippe Petain had succeeded in quelling the mutinies that followed the disastrous attacks of Gen. Robert Georges Nivelle on the Aisne River in April 1917, French morale had not been completely restored. Three years of bitter offensive fighting had so depleted France's manpower that much of her infantry now consisted of men too young or too old to be the most effective fighters. The British personnel problem was also acute. Infantry units were composed mostly of replacements, but their morale was much better than that of the French, and they could be depended on to fight. Prime Minister David Lloyd George, however, fearing that Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (later 1st Earl Haig) would repeat his costly and futile attacks of 1917, refused to send large reinforcements to the Continent. Haig was forced to reduce the battalions in his divisions from 12 to 9, thereby generating resentment among the officers and men whose units were disbanded.

The Italian disaster at Caporetto (now Kobarid) in October 1917 had necessitated the dispatch of 11 precious Allied divisions to bolster the faltering Italians, who even by 1918 had not fully recovered. Russia and Rumania had been knocked out of the war by the Germans, and American troops were slow in arriving. On March 1, 1918, nearly a year after she had entered the war, the United States had only 6 divisions in France; of these, 2 lacked combat experience, and the other 4 had served only in quiet sectors. The only recourse for the Allies seemed to be to hold fast on the western front until American forces arrived in sufficient strength to launch a general offensive. The French and British accordingly took up a defense in depth over most of the front (similar to the defensive system developed by the Germans in 1917) and braced to meet the German onslaught, which was sure to come. Haig and Petain agreed to assist each other promptly in case of attack, but there was no unity of command to guide the Allied effort forcibly. The Supreme War Council, with no troops under its control, could act only as an advisory body. A plan to form a 30-division general reserve under the council's control had been vitiated by Haig's contention that he could not spare any divisions and still retain responsibility for his front.

The general situation of the Germans was little better than that of the Allies. Although submarine warfare had greatly reduced Allied shipping, it had failed to starve Great Britain or to halt the flow of American troops across the Atlantic. Conversely, the Allied blockade, coupled with the inefficient use of the internal transportation system, was causing hunger and discontent among the German people. Germany's allies were faltering: Austria-Hungary, through popular pressure, refused to send troops to the western front, preferring to concentrate her forces against the Italians; Turkey's armies had been futilely expended in Mesopotamia and Palestine; and Bulgaria was war weary. Nevertheless, the German manpower situation was more favorable than that of the French and British, for the collapse of Russia had released sizable German forces from the eastern front. Many of these divisions, having seen little fighting for almost a year, were fresh, and their troops were eager to fight.

Gen. Erich F. W. Ludendorff, through his string of victories, keen intellect, and strong personality, had by now overshadowed Emperor William II and the successive German chancellors, and the decision as to the next major German move was his to make. A victory was needed to bolster Germany's prestige among her allies; moreover, the Americans were arriving in increasing numbers and would make their strength felt by summer. Ludendorff concluded that decisive action was mandatory on the western front in the spring of 1918, and plans were prepared accordingly. Troop transfers from the eastern front gave him a 10 percent advantage in combat personnel in the west, but he lacked reserve strength, since the reservoir of German youth had been almost drained by heavy demands in previous years. This deficiency made it imperative that the initial attack be decisive, for if its impetus were retarded, there would be little left to engage. Ludendorff, however, was confident of the effectiveness of his numerical superiority and of the success of new German offensive tactics.

Three areas were considered for the offensive: Verdun, Flanders, and the Somme. The Verdun area was rejected because of the difficult terrain and the lack of a major strategic objective. The Flanders area was the best, for.. a breakthrough there would lead to the channel ports, which were vital to the British on the Continent, but the wet ground in the area precluded an attack before April. While there was no critical terrain feature in the Somme area, a breakthrough to the sea would separate the French and British and would crowd the latter into a pocket in which they might later be destroyed. Thus the Somme area was chosen of necessity. Since it had been devastated in the 1916 battles, the speed of the German advance would be reduced; on the other hand, it was the most lightly held sector of the three considered. Ludendorff selected the British as his primary target because he believed that the defeat of Britain would bring a favorable peace. Moreover, he considered the French troops the more skillful (if less tenacious) in defensive operations, and the expert French artillery was much to be feared. His staff had urged two limited offensives at different points to throw the Allies off balance, but Ludendorff, experienced only in successful single crushing offensives on the eastern front, decided that he had enough troops and guns for only one major offensive. To deceive the Allies and to facilitate other attacks if these should be found desirable, however, preliminary preparations, such as the stockpiling of ammunition, were begun at two places in Flanders: opposite the Ypres (leper) salient, and to the south of it. In addition, simulated preparatory bombardments were planned at other places along the front.