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Eastern Fronta. War
Plans
Russian and German strategy and tactics on the eastern front were determined largely by the terrain. In the middle of the line was the Polish salient, at this time a part of Russia, comprising an area 230 miles long and 210 miles wide and leading directly into Germany. On the broad Vistula River, which crossed the salient, was the fortress city of Warsaw. Warsaw had important defensive value, but it could also serve as a base for a Russian offensive westward into the rich mining and industrial area of Silesia. Russia could not make a direct advance against Silesia and Berlin, located only 180 miles from the western extremity of the salient, without first safeguarding the flanks of East Prussia to the north and Galicia to the south. If the Germans in East Prussia and the Austrians in Galicia launched converging attacks across the flat land against Brest-Litovsk (now Brest) at the center of the salient, Russian forces west of the Vistula could be cut off. To defend themselves against such attacks, the Russians built a series of fortresses along the Neman and Narew rivers and at Lublin and Kholm (now Chehn). No Russian troops were stationed in the area west of Warsaw, which was kept without railroads and roads in order to prevent a rapid German advance. To defend East Prussia the Germans constructed fortifications on the upper Vistula and a forward line in the lake district east of Allenstein (now Olsztyn), while in Galicia the Austrians built a fortified defensive barrier along the Carpathian Mountains centering on Lemberg (now Lvov) and running from Krakow to the Rumanian border. Thus the Polish salient was hemmed in and threatened from both north and south. Russia proper was divided from the salient by the Pripet Marshes, a region of swamps, forests, and few roads. To the north, south, and east stretched vast areas that could swallow whole armies. Railways played an important role in the strategy of
the eastern front. Germany had 17 lines leading to the Russian frontier,
with a capacity of 500 troop trains daily, enabling her to concentrate
a vast force on the border within a few days of a declaration of war.
Piercing the Carpathians were 7 Austrian rail lines, permitting a flow
of 250 trains daily from Hungary into Galicia. Both the German and Austrian
railway systems also had numerous spurs branching off from the trunklines
and running parallel to the frontiers. These facilitated rapid deployment
and redeployment to repel attacks or to mount offensives. On the Russian
side 6 trunklines, several of which were double tracked, radiated from
Warsaw to the interior. All the military strength of the Russian Empire
could be drawn up along the lines passing through Kiev, Moscow, and
St. Petersburg (renamed Petrograd in 1914), but there were few spur
lines. The relative lack of north-south lines prevented the Russians
from rapidly shifting men along the front to mount surprise attacks
or to counter German tactics. These shortcomings in railway transportation
(and in the road network) later handicapped the Germans as they penetrated
Russia east of the Polish salient.
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