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The War at Sea
German Submarine Campaign
Germany's answer to the Allied blockade was its submarine
campaign against merchant shipping. In order to view this submarine
warfare properly as a form of blockade of Great Britain, certain facts
must be kept in mind:
(1) Four fifths of Britain's food, all of her raw materials
except coal, and half of her iron had to be imported.
(2) British war plans had assumed that the Grand Fleet,
by containing the High Seas Fleet, would maintain control of the seas
and thus preserve the overseas lifeline. The Allies could therefore
proceed with the blockade of Germany without fear of retaliation.
(3) Command of the sea enabled the Allies to draw on
the resources of the United States and deny these resources to Germany.
The United States therefore became the major and even the predominating
force in the struggle.
(4) Despite the size and efficiency of the High Seas
Fleet, the Germans were unable to change the prewar naval situation
by surface forces alone.
(5) The submarine was singularly fitted for attacking
the large concentrations of shipping in the approaches to the British
Isles.
The success of the U-9 in sinking three cruisers in
a matter of minutes in September 1914 opened the eyes of German naval
officers to the potentiality of the submarine, and as early as November
of that year German naval authorities recommended its use against British
sea trade. The German political point of view, however, was that, while
there were no legal obstacles to a U-boat campaign, a decision to embark
on this new type of warfare would be made only when the military position
on the Continent was so secure that there could be no doubt of the eventual
outcome.
By February 1915, the campaign on the western front
had been stalemated, and it was apparent that the war was not to be
the short one that the General Staff had planned. In November 1914,
Great Britain had declared the sea approaches to Germany a war zone
forbidden to merchantmen. In addition, the list of contraband had been
extended to include even grain. The Germans knew that such economic
pressure would increase, with their country becoming a fortress beset,
and it was this knowledge that led them to decide to use submarines
in the war against Allied seaborne trade. On Feb. 4, 1915, the waters
around the British Isles were declared a war zone where (effective February
18) submarines would destroy enemy ships and neutral merchantmen would
travel at their own risk.
The submarine was unable to comply with the rules of
international law adopted for a war against trade by cruisers, for it
could ensure its own safety only by sinking ships without warning. The
German leaders failed to take into account the reaction of world opinion,
especially opinion in the United States, to the changes in the rules
of warfare which they were unilaterally adopting to suit the new weapon.
They tried to justify their stand on the ground that Great Britain had
been the first to violate international law, but they failed to recognize
that British policy offered neutrals an alternative, while their own
presented only an ultimatum: cease trade with the Allies or risk destruction
of life and property.
The one nation strong enough to dispute the new German
attitude toward international law had only a small merchant marine,
but American public opinion was shocked at the loss of life that this
new warfare would evidently cause, and the United States government
refused to compromise on the rights of its citizens to travel under
the protection of international law.
After the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, with
the loss of 128 American lives, three notes were required to convince
the German government that it had to take cognizance of American public
opinion. The first indication of a tendency to yield appeared when Berlin
made apologies and offers of reparations for the destruction of two
United States freighters, which the Germans claimed had been sunk by
mistake. On August 19, the British liner Arabic was sunk under conditions
similar to those of the Lusitania, but before any action could be taken
by the United States Germany requested President Woodrow Wilson to await
official investigation. On September 1, the German government submitted
the information that the Arabic had been destroyed in error after the
German commanders had been instructed not to sink liners without warning
and without providing for the safety of the passengers. On March 24,
1916, however, the British channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed with
the loss of several American lives. After a brief correspondence, on
April 18, the United States government demanded assurances that ships
would no longer be sunk without warning and without regard for the safety
of persons on board, and threatened to sever diplomatic relations if
such assurances were not given. Faced with an ultimatum, the German
government yielded, but in its reply of May 4 included a statement that
it expected the United States to induce Great Britain also to observe
the rules of international law. The United States refused to admit that
the rights of its citizens could be held conditionally, and there the
matter rested until January 1917.
Behind these events lay a controversy within the German
government. The naval administration headed by Admiral von Tirpitz held
that the more vigorously the war was prosecuted the sooner it would
come to an end, and that, since the economic life of Great Britain was
entirely dependent on shipping, it was the duty of the German Navy to
strike her in this area. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg held
that it was his duty to make diplomacy succeed, and this view, which
had the support of the emperor, prevailed for a time. On March 16, 1916,
Tirpitz resigned. Admiral Scheer refused to use submarines against merchantmen
in the approaches to Great Britain under the restricted conditions required
by international law and withdrew them for use against military targets.
In the Mediterranean and in the White Sea off Arkhangelsk the submarine
war against shipping continued with considerable success under the restricted
conditions.
The submarine policy of the navy was approved by the
German people, who wanted to strike at Britain in any way possible.
By the end of 1916 it was evident that Germany was not winning the war.
After a German offer of peace negotiations had been rejected by the
Allies, the naval party received the powerful support of Field Marshal
Paul von Hindenburg and Gen. Erich F. W. Ludendorff. The chancellor
acquiesced, and on Jan. 31, 1917, the German government announced the
resumption of unrestricted warfare after February 1. The United States
was left with no choice but to break off diplomatic relations on February
3, and, after several attacks on American ships, to declare war on Germany
on April 6, 1917.
The German decision to adopt unrestricted submarine
warfare was made on the assumptions that (1) six months of such a campaign
would force the British to sue for peace; (2) the United States would
probably not become a serious military factor within this time; and
(3 ), if it did, German submarines would prevent American troops from
reaching France. None of these assumptions proved valid, but the British
people did not know how close they came to defeat until after the war.
In the spring of 1917 one ship in four that left Britain did not return,
and Admiral Jellicoe, then first sea lord, admitted that the war could
be lost by November.
Britain was saved by the convoy system and by German
overconfidence. The adoption of a policy of convoying ships rather than
patrolling areas had been advocated for some time by a group of younger
officers in the Royal Navy, but they could not overcome the opposition
of their seniors until they obtained the sponsorship of Rear Adm. William
S. Sims, commander of the United States forces in European waters. The
Germans put their faith in an all-out effort that would produce very
heavy losses in shipping in a few months rather than in a sustained
effort over a longer period. All available submarines were sent to sea,
maintenance was curtailed, and submarine building was cut back. By the
autumn of 1917, however, this gamble had been lost, and resumption of
building in 1918 was too late to affect the issue.
Meanwhile, for every submarine unit the Germans put
into the attack, the Allies had to muster 20 units to counter it. Reports
of submarine losses indicate that 39 percent were destroyed by patrols,
30 percent by mines, and 8 percent by submarines, with aircraft a poor
fourth. Casualties in the German submarine service ran as high as 50
percent. Nevertheless, submarine crews played no part in the mutinies
within the fleet that in large measure brought on the surrender of Germany.
They remained loyal to the end.
Proper allocation of shipping was almost as important
to the salvation of Great Britain as the convoy system, the antisubmarine
weapons, and German overconfidence. In addition to the losses by submarines,
a large amount of British shipping had to be withdrawn from trade for
military uses. Building programs in the early days of the war were devoted
primarily to naval vessels, and until 1918 merchant shipbuilding was
never able to compensate for the losses. In the beginning of the war
it was impossible to obtain any form of allocation of shipping, and
different interests often bid against each other. By 1917, however,
most commodities were under government control, and it was possible
to set up an agency for the control of shipping with representatives
from such users as the War Office, Board of Trade, Ministry of Munitions,
and Ministry of Food. War risk insurance was provided to induce neutral
merchant vessels to continue trading with the Allies. By 1917 all maritime
countries except the Netherlands allowed their ships to be used, and
the Dutch ships were taken over by right of angary. German ships interned
in American ports were put into the shipping pool after the United States
became a belligerent.
The American role in the war at sea was not dramatic.
Naval units served as parts of British naval task forces. American destroyers
operated out of Queenstown (now Cobh), Ireland, and patrol craft of
other types operated elsewhere. United States transports carried a large
proportion of American troops to Europe but, despite the demands on
Allied shipping, not the major portion. A division of battleships reinforced
the Grand Fleet, and another was stationed in Bantry Bay, Ireland, to
cover the disembarkation ports of Brest and St. Nazaire.
In summary; Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare,
while threatening the Allies with defeat, brought the United States
in on their side. The defeat of the U-boat by the convoy system made
possible the transportation of 2 million American soldiers to France,
or enough to offset the collapse of the Russian Army and to assure Allied
victory.
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