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The War at Sea
Dardanelles Campaign
By 1915 the war on the western front had stabilized
into one of grinding attrition that was to absorb millions of men and
such vast quantities of ammunition that the economies of all countries
almost collapsed under the strain. Since Britain was then the only Allied
power that held the initiative, some British leaders looked for means
of outflanking the German position and establishing communications with
Russia. Lord Fisher wanted a combined naval and military attack in the
Baltic and started a building program for such a great amphibious undertaking.
This plan, however, was not considered seriously by anyone else. It
could succeed only at enormous cost, for the Germans feared such an
attack and would have resisted it furiously.
An alternative was opening the Dardanelles. Churchill,
who at first espoused the Baltic plan, now shifted his interest to what
appeared to be a less costly project. French military leaders and some
British opposed the operation, which they feared would withdraw or withhold
troops from France. The 1st Earl Kitchener, who was the secretary of
state for war, wanted to strengthen Russia but refused at this time
to make any troops available. Churchill accordingly agreed to a primarily
naval attack.
Fisher would agree to the Dardanelles operation only
if certain conditions, including the use of troops, were fulfilled.
Churchill solved his dilemma by going over Fisher's head to the naval
commander in the area, Vice Adm. Sackville H. Carden, who provided a
plan that combined reduction of the Dardanelles forts by naval gunfire
with minesweeping. Obsolete French and British battleships, whose loss
would not affect the seapower balance, were to be used. The new battleship
Queen Elizabeth was added, and an enthusiastic Churchill could see the
Dardanelles forts falling successively before her 15inch guns.
Carden's plan had made no provision for dealing with
mobile artillery, and Churchill assumed that the British intelligence
reports were correct. These, however, gave information only on the forts
and none on the action of Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders, head of the German
military mission to Turkey. Liman von Sanders realized that, in addition
to the forts, the mine fields would have to be covered by mobile artillery.
He bypassed Constantinople in the movement of this artillery and, by
keeping its movement secret even from the German commander of the Dardanelles
defenses, prevented British intelligence from learning of its existence.
After the combined naval attack was agreed on, British
leaders hurried the project and failed to make proper preparations,
especially for minesweeping. The first attack of the FrancoBritish squadrons
on the outer forts was made on Feb. 19, 1915, and a second attack followed
on February 25. The outer forts were reduced, but after the initial
bombardments it became evident to Carden that amphibious troops were
needed. Churchill ignored his requests, insisting that he go on with
the original plan. Operations were renewed on March 4, and were continued
for two weeks, with the big ships bombing by day and the minesweepers
attempting to sweep at night. The latter could make little progress
against the current, however, and suffered heavily from the field guns.
Carden's health finally broke down, and he was relieved
by Rear Adm. Sir John de Robeck, who decided on an all-out daylight
bombardment with minesweeping operations under its cover. This attack
was made on March 18. Things went well until early afternoon. The forts
appeared to have been silenced, but when the minesweepers proceeded
to their work, the field guns drove them back with heavy losses. A French
battleship, Bouvet, had already been sunk by an unswept mine. De Robeck
recalled his heavy ships, and in the retirement another battleship and
a battle cruiser were destroyed by mines, while a second cruiser was
damaged. Two other ships were put out of action by gunfire. De Robeck
ordered a general withdrawal.
The whole problem was then reappraised, and a purely
naval attack was abandoned. The campaign against Constantinople was
to go on, however, with the army now given the main task and the navy
assisting it. An army force under Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, consisting
of a regular division from England, the Australian and New Zealand troops,
a naval infantry division, and a few French, had been assembled in Egypt.
This force was not prepared for assault amphibious operations, however,
and a month was lost in reloading. Liman von Sanders thus had the time
he needed to get ready for the attack, which was made on the Gallipoli
Peninsula on April 25, 1916. The whole campaign eventually failed, the
Allies suffering their most costly setback of the war. The result was
a shakeup in the British cabinet that included the removal of Churchill.
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