The War at Sea
Dardanelles Campaign

By 1915 the war on the western front had stabilized into one of grinding attrition that was to absorb millions of men and such vast quantities of ammunition that the economies of all countries almost collapsed under the strain. Since Britain was then the only Allied power that held the initiative, some British leaders looked for means of outflanking the German position and establishing communications with Russia. Lord Fisher wanted a combined naval and military attack in the Baltic and started a building program for such a great amphibious undertaking. This plan, however, was not considered seriously by anyone else. It could succeed only at enormous cost, for the Germans feared such an attack and would have resisted it furiously.

An alternative was opening the Dardanelles. Churchill, who at first espoused the Baltic plan, now shifted his interest to what appeared to be a less costly project. French military leaders and some British opposed the operation, which they feared would withdraw or withhold troops from France. The 1st Earl Kitchener, who was the secretary of state for war, wanted to strengthen Russia but refused at this time to make any troops available. Churchill accordingly agreed to a primarily naval attack.

Fisher would agree to the Dardanelles operation only if certain conditions, including the use of troops, were fulfilled. Churchill solved his dilemma by going over Fisher's head to the naval commander in the area, Vice Adm. Sackville H. Carden, who provided a plan that combined reduction of the Dardanelles forts by naval gunfire with minesweeping. Obsolete French and British battleships, whose loss would not affect the seapower balance, were to be used. The new battleship Queen Elizabeth was added, and an enthusiastic Churchill could see the Dardanelles forts falling successively before her 15inch guns.

Carden's plan had made no provision for dealing with mobile artillery, and Churchill assumed that the British intelligence reports were correct. These, however, gave information only on the forts and none on the action of Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission to Turkey. Liman von Sanders realized that, in addition to the forts, the mine fields would have to be covered by mobile artillery. He bypassed Constantinople in the movement of this artillery and, by keeping its movement secret even from the German commander of the Dardanelles defenses, prevented British intelligence from learning of its existence.

After the combined naval attack was agreed on, British leaders hurried the project and failed to make proper preparations, especially for minesweeping. The first attack of the FrancoBritish squadrons on the outer forts was made on Feb. 19, 1915, and a second attack followed on February 25. The outer forts were reduced, but after the initial bombardments it became evident to Carden that amphibious troops were needed. Churchill ignored his requests, insisting that he go on with the original plan. Operations were renewed on March 4, and were continued for two weeks, with the big ships bombing by day and the minesweepers attempting to sweep at night. The latter could make little progress against the current, however, and suffered heavily from the field guns.

Carden's health finally broke down, and he was relieved by Rear Adm. Sir John de Robeck, who decided on an all-out daylight bombardment with minesweeping operations under its cover. This attack was made on March 18. Things went well until early afternoon. The forts appeared to have been silenced, but when the minesweepers proceeded to their work, the field guns drove them back with heavy losses. A French battleship, Bouvet, had already been sunk by an unswept mine. De Robeck recalled his heavy ships, and in the retirement another battleship and a battle cruiser were destroyed by mines, while a second cruiser was damaged. Two other ships were put out of action by gunfire. De Robeck ordered a general withdrawal.

The whole problem was then reappraised, and a purely naval attack was abandoned. The campaign against Constantinople was to go on, however, with the army now given the main task and the navy assisting it. An army force under Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, consisting of a regular division from England, the Australian and New Zealand troops, a naval infantry division, and a few French, had been assembled in Egypt. This force was not prepared for assault amphibious operations, however, and a month was lost in reloading. Liman von Sanders thus had the time he needed to get ready for the attack, which was made on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25, 1916. The whole campaign eventually failed, the Allies suffering their most costly setback of the war. The result was a shakeup in the British cabinet that included the removal of Churchill.