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The War at Sea
Battle of Jutland
Short Summary:
BATTLE OF JUTLAND, 1916: OPENING PHASE
The German High Seas Fleet sortied from its base in
the Jade Bay anchorage to raid Allied shipping off Norway and attack
the British blockading force. The British, by decoding German radio
messages learned of this move, and their Grand Fleet put to sea to intercept
it. By 2 P.M. on May 31, the two fleets were in position. At this time,
neither Adm. Sir John Jellicoe nor Adm. Reinhard Scheer knew that he
was confronting his opponent's main fleet.
BATTLE OF JUTLAND, 1916: FINAL PHASE
The first action was between the scouting forces of
Rear Adm. David Beatty and Rear Adm. Franz von Hipper. Hipper sought
to lure Beatty south to the main German force under Scheer. Beatty spotted
Scheer in time and reversed his course, attempting in turn to lure Scheer
to Jellicoe's battleships. The two main fleets met about 6 P.M. and
engaged each other until dark; Jellicoe, meanwhile, succeeded in getting
between Scheer and his base. During darkness the Germans broke through
the British formation and escaped to the Jade anchorage. Both sides
suffered serious but not crippling losses. The German High Seas Fleet
made no major sorties thereafter.
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The next major naval action, the Battle of Jutland (or
Skagerrak, as it was called by the Germans), took place on May 31-June
1, 1916. The war had been in progress for almost two years before this
main fleet action toward which the building and training of navies had
been directed for a generation finally took place. The two fleets had
been acting on the defensive, but events in early 1916 brought a change
in their attitude. Russia, blockaded by Germany, was suffering more
than Germany, blockaded by Britain. To break this blockade the Allies
would have .to gain control of the Baltic, and before this could be
done the High Seas Fleet had to be destroyed. The Grand Fleet now had
suitable bases along the east coast of Britain closer to Germany and
was in a better position to press for the necessary decisive action.
On the German side command of the High Seas Fleet had been taken over
by a new man, Reinhard Scheer, a choice of Tirpitz and an advocate of
offensive action. Scheer planned a series of raids in which all forces,
including submarines and zeppelin airships, would be used. The purpose
of these raids was to draw out detachments of the British fleets, which
would be attacked by submarines and surface forces.
The first German raid was made by a force of battle
cruisers, which on April 25, 1916, bombarded Lowestoft and Yarmouth.
Scheer next planned a bombardment of Sunderland, but bad weather caused
him to make instead a sweep to the north to raid Allied shipping off
Scandinavia and possibly attack the British blockading force, the 10th
Cruiser Squadron. If necessary, he could withdraw via the Skagerrak.
The High Seas Fleet, with 16 modern and 8 old battleships
under Scheer and 5 battle cruisers under Hipper, sortied from the Jade
for this operation in the early hours of May 31, and headed north with
Hipper about 50 miles ahead of Scheer. Since the British were still
reading coded German radio dispatches, the Grand Fleet got to sea even
before the Germans. The main body under Jellicoe, which consisted of
24 dreadnoughts and 3 battle cruisers with attached light forces, left
Scapa Flow and Invergordon at about 10 P.M. on May 30. At the same time,
the scouting force under Admiral Beatty, consisting of 6 battle cruisers
and 4 modern battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, left Rosyth.
Both groups proceeded eastward separately. At 2 P.M. on May 31, Beatty
was to be 70 miles south of Jellicoe, and if at this time he had not
sighted the Germans, he was to turn north and join the commander in
chief. Neither Jellicoe nor Scheer knew that the main body of the other's
fleet was at sea, for Scheer had taken the precaution of having the
radio guard ship in port acknowledge all messages addressed to him.
Shortly before Beatty was to turn north, one of his
cruisers sighted smoke to the east, which was found to come from a Danish
freighter that had been stopped by two German destroyers. This contact
brought on the battle, for at 2:20 P.M. Beatty turned southeast and
increased speed, hoping to get between the enemy and his base. Meanwhile,
Hipper, on learning of the contact, turned to a northwesterly course
to develop it. The light forces screening Beatty and Hipper had by this
time been drawn off to the north, so that at 3:25 P.M. the battle cruiser
squadrons sighted each other without previous warning. Beatty's 4 battleships
were several miles astern of him.
To prevent the British from getting between him and
Scheer, Hipper reversed course. With both forces on parallel courses,
fire was then opened at about 17,000 yards and continued for an hour.
The German fire was more effective, sinking the battle cruiser Indefatigable
at 4:06 P.M. and the Queen Mary at 4:26 P.M. Beatty's flagship, the
Lion, lost a turret, as did the German Seydlitz. Other ships on both
sides also received hits. The Germans at this time were leading the
British battle cruisers toward the main body. The German battleships
were sighted at 4:33 P.M. by the 2d Light Cruiser Squadron under Commodore
William E. Goodenough, who in Beatty's van was alone properly performing
the duties of a light force. Beatty held his course until 4:40 P.M.,
when, with the High Seas Fleet in sight, he turned north to come close
to Jellicoe. His 4 heavy battleships, which by this time had taken the
German battle cruisers under fire, continued on a southerly course until
4:57 P.M., passing Beatty and covering his rear. The pursuit north lasted
until 6 P.M., during which time Goodenough, under fire of the German
battleships, nevertheless maintained contact and sent accurate reports.
The battleship squadrons of the Grand Fleet in the meantime were approaching
on a southeasterly course, while the battle cruisers, under Rear Admiral
Sir Horace Hood, were considerably to the east. The choice of deployment
of the battleships from a cruising formation of line of divisions into
a long line ahead had to be made on either the right-hand or the left-hand
division. Since this decision depended on the location of the German
battlelines, Jellicoe delayed his deployment signal until 6:14 P.M.,
when he finally obtained the correct position of the German main body
from Beatty. He deployed his squadrons to the left and took an easterly
course to get between the German Fleet and the coast. This maneuver
took about 20 minutes, during which time Beatty's cruisers crossed the
line of deploying battleships and took up stations in their van. Hood
took position ahead of Beatty, while Beatty's 4 battleships took position
in the rear of the battleship squadrons of the Grand Fleet.
The German main body, led by Hipper, was then on a northeasterly
course. Hood's battle cruisers first came into contact with the Germans
and took them under a heavy fire, which put the Liitzow, Hipper's flagship,
out of action at 6:33 P.M. Hood's flagship, the Invincible, was herself
sunk by fire from the German battle cruisers and the leading battleships.
The battleships on both sides were now beginning to
engage with the Germans in a bad position, the whole British fleet crossing
their van. By 6:26 P.M. the German battle cruisers in the lead were
forced to turn away to prevent being caught in a trap. At 6:35 P.M.,
Scheer ordered his famous Gefechtskehrtwendung ( emergency retirement
by ripple movement from the rear), a maneuver which his ships had often
practiced, and which was successfully accomplished despite an elbow
in the line.
In the poor visibility, Jellicoe did not see this turnaway
and lost contact with the enemy. Keeping to his purpose of getting between
the Germans and their base, however, he changed from an easterly to
a southeasterly course. Scheer, having successfully extricated himself,
for some unknown reason once more reversed course and returned to the
battle on an easterly heading, almost at right angles to the British
battleline, which in the meantime had changed to the south.
The German Fleet was no sooner turned on an easterly
course again than it was reported at 7:00 P.M. by the ever-watchful
Goodenough. A few minutes later, at 7:05 P.M., the British battle cruisers
commenced firing, and some of the battleships shortly followed suit.
The range was down to 7,500 yards, and visibility conditions were now
most favorable to the British. At 7:13 P.M., Scheer again extricated
his battleships from a bad position by an emergency retirement behind
the continued engagement of his battered battle cruisers and a destroyer
torpedo attack. The torpedo attack was successful, for at 7:21 P.M.
Jellicoe ordered a turnaway of 45° from south to southeast. The
British battleship divisions remained on this course for 14 minutes,
until the German torpedoes passed their line, whereupon Jellicoe again
returned to a southwesterly course. The turnaway maneuver lost Jellicoe
his chance to destroy the German Fleet.
After breaking contact, the Germans changed to a southerly course. From
8 to 9 P.M., the British were generally on southwesterly courses, and
the battle cruisers in the van again made contact and scored some hits
before the Germans turned away to the west. In the closing daylight,
Jellicoe now decided not to endeavor to regain contact, and at 9 P.M.,
realizing that he was between the Germans and their bases and in a favorable
position for action the following morning, he put the fleet on a night
course of south. A light cruiser squadron was placed in the van, while
destroyers covered the rear. At 9:30 P.M., the British battleship squadrons
were approximately 10 miles east of the German High Seas Fleet, while
the British battle cruisers were approximately 5 miles ahead of it.
Scheer, who knew only that the British were east of
him, was determined to break through and return to his base. Putting
his heaviest ships in the van, he set his course to the southeast with
orders to hold it regardless of cost. The result was a series of confused
but deadly night encounters from 10 P.M. to 2 A.M., as the Germans forced
their way through the British light forces, leaving a trail of burning
vessels to mark their course as surely as the compass in Scheer's flagship.
Two British battleships saw this night action but did not report it,
and Jellicoe himself failed to realize the significance of the gunfire
astern. It was not until 5:40 A.M. that he knew the German Fleet had
evaded him. Scheer anchored in the Jade about noon on June 1, and with
all chance of further action gone the Grand Fleet headed back for its
bases.
The Battle of Jutland, involving over 250 ships, was
and probably will remain the greatest battle in naval history. It was
also one of the most indecisive and subsequently the most studied. Records
were kept in every ship, even in the height of action, of almost every
happening pertaining to navigation, ordnance, propelling machinery,
and casualties. Approximately 10,000 messages were sent during the battle,
and 300 action reports were prepared after it. Sufficient data was available
to locate 65 percent of the major-caliber hits. The wealth of material
resulted in the battle's receiving an emphasis in naval circles far
greater than it deserved. The myth of the battleline engagement was
preserved for another 25 years, after the airplane and the submarine
had changed the whole nature of naval warfare. The indecisive result
should have revealed that technological advances had outdistanced the
commander's means of controlling his forces, and that the tactical doctrine
of steam navies had not yet reached full development.
Both sides showed inability to use light forces properly
for reconnaissance and security. The Germans were superior in gunnery
and ship handling. By holding to the principle of the offensive, Scheer
extricated his fleet from some dangerous situations. Jellicoe, obsessed
with the safety of his battleships, missed his one chance to obtain
a decisive action. The result was that the German Fleet remained to
be a bulwark for its submarines. The British were forced to keep a mass
of light craft locked up with the Grand Fleet when they were urgently
needed for the struggle against the submarine. Far more important perhaps,
the High Seas Fleet, by still barring the Baltic, hastened the destruction
of Russia and the consequent rise of communism.
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