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Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision
Reduction of the German Salients
1. Aisne-Marne
Offensive, July 18-August 61
2. Reduction of the Amiens Salient, August 8
- September 3
3. St.Mihiel
Offensive, September 12-16
Reduction of the Amiens Salient, August 8 - September
3
Short Summary:
REDUCTION OF THE AMIENS SALIENT (Aug. 8-Sept. 3, 1918). The Amiens salient
was created during the first German drive. In August, Allied forces,
predominately British, strongly supported by tanks, forced the Germans
to give way and drove them back to the Hindenburg Line, from which they
had started their first drive in March.
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In mid-July, plans were developed for operations against
the Germans in the Amiens salient, and preparations were begun. The
main attack was to be made almost directly eastward from Amiens by the
Fourth British Army of Gen. Sir Henry Seymour Rawlinson (later 1st Baron
Rawlinson) ; assisted on the right by Gen. Marie Eugene Debeney's First
French Army. Gen. Georges Louis Humbert's Third French Army was to exert
pressure against the southern face of the salient. Rawlinson amassed
on a 10-mile front a powerful striking force: 17 infantry divisions
( including 1 American division and two of the best fighting corps on
the western front-the Canadian Corps of 4 divisions and the Australian
Corps of 5 divisions); 3 cavalry divisions; about 600 tanks, the majority
of which were of a new and much-improved type; 2,000 guns; and 800 fighter
and bomber aircraft. Debeney had 10 divisions but few tanks; he was
to be supported by 1,100 aircraft. To oppose this avalanche the Germans
had two armies-Marwitz's Second and Hutier's Eighteenth-totaling 20
divisions, mostly of dubious quality, supported by few tanks and less
than 400 aircraft.
Because of the disparity in numbers of tanks, the attacks
of the British Fourth and the French First armies were to differ. Rawlinson
was to use the tactics which had proved so successful at Cambrai in
November 1917. There the tanks followed by the infantry had advanced
under the cover of a rolling barrage. Since surprise was essential in
this type of attack, no artillery preparation was to be used. Debeney,
lacking tanks, had to attack conventionally. His offensive was to be
delayed about an hour in order to allow for artillery preparation and
yet not jeopardize the surprise of the British attack.
At 4:20 A.M. on August 8, the British Fourth Army struck
in a helpful mist, and Debeney joined in the attack at the appointed
time. Although Ludendorff had taken special precautions to strengthen
this important part of the front, it now collapsed. The German infantry
could not stand up against the British tanks, and 6 divisions, considered
battleworthy by Ludendorff, gave way at once. It was not the effectiveness
of fire from the tanks that demoralized the Germans (this was wobbly
and erratic), but the inexorable advance of the steel monsters against
infantrymen who had no defense against them. (Advancing against artillery
fire, tanks usually suffered about 25 percent casualties a day in an
attack.) Within two hours the British had taken 16,000 prisoners and
200 guns; by noon tanks and armored cars, as well as cavalry, were 9
miles to the rear of the German lines. Debeney's advance had not been
as spectacular as that of the British, but it progressed successfully.
This great Allied victory caused Ludendorff to call Aug. 8, 1918, the
"black day" of the German Army, since for the first time entire
units collapsed. Retreating troops called out to reinforcements marching
toward the front: "You're prolonging the war."
By August 10, the Canadian and Australian corps and the Cavalry Corps
had advanced 12 miles and were close to the strong German RoyeChaulnes
position. The French First Army was rapidly catching up, and Humbert's
Third Army was successfully driving northward. Foch urged Haig to exploit
these successes and drive straight east to the Somme, but Haig insisted
that the Roye-Chaulnes position was too strong to be broken without
extensive preparations, including the moving up of heavy artillery.
Instead, he wanted to suspend the attack and to open a new one with
Byng's Third British Army on the north flank of Rawlinson's Fourth Army.
Foch finally agreed to this plan, and Haig shifted his reserves to the
north for the new drive, which was to be opened on August 21. The Germans
conducted a zone defense before Byng's attack, falling back 3 miles
to their main position. From there they counterattacked on August 22.
The crafty Haig had foreseen this maneuver, however, and had engaged
only part of his force on the first day. Hence he was able to beat off
the counterattack and maintain his momentum. On August 23, he ordered
a general advance along a 30-mile front. The increasing pressure in
the north caused the Germans to evacuate the Roye Chaulnes position,
as Haig had predicted. In brilliant operations the .Australians captured
the dominating heights of Mont-St.-Quentin on August 30-31, and two
days later the Canadians broke the elaborate German switch position
east of Arras. The Germans then withdrew to the Hindenburg Line, whence
they had started their first drive five months earlier. The Amiens salient
had been wiped out.
The mounting German disasters brought on during August
a crown council at which governmental and military leaders discussed
their future actions. Ludendorff offered his resignation, but it was
refused. The decision was made to fall back fighting and to maintain
a foothold in France as long as possible. Peace negotiations were to
be opened through the mediation of neutrals, but, as it turned out,
little was done for some time.
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