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Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision
Allied Final Offensive
1. Foch's Plan
2. Operations,
September 26-October 31.
a. Southern Pincer (Meuse-Argonne)
b.Western Pincer (Cambrai-St.-Quentin)
c. Flanders offensive
d. Operations of the French Center
3. German
Situation
4. Allied
Operations, November 1-11
a. Allied Attacks from the South
b. Allied Attacks from the West
5. The
Armistice
6. Occupation
of Germany
Foch's Plan
Since June, Foch had been contemplating a general offensive
in September, but he apparently did not believe that such an offensive
would be decisive at that time, for he continued to urge the British
and Americans to strengthen their forces for a decisive effort in 1919.
Nevertheless, the Aisne-Marne and Amiens victories had clearly demonstrated
the superiority of the Allied armies. To Foch this ascendancy seemed
to justify an attempt to gain the victory in 1918. The British cabinet
was reluctant to permit Haig to engage in such an enterprise, believing
that the final drives could not be made before 1919, but the general
went to London and persuaded the cabinet to accept Foch's view.
Foch realized that his offensive could be frustrated
by a rapid withdrawal of the Germans to the frontiers, combined with
the thorough demolition of roads and railways in their wake. Such a
retreat would compel the Allies to build new communications as they
advanced, and it would probably be impossible for them to make a major
coordinated attack against the German frontiers before the spring of
1919. A rapid German withdrawal would necessitate the abandonment of
vast stores of supplies and equipment that had been built up in France
and Belgium, however, and the German General Staff could not reconcile
itself to this sacrifice. Understanding all of these factors, Foch is
said to have remarked: "The man could still escape if he did not
mind leaving his luggage behind." The keystone of Foch's offensive
plan accordingly became the prevention of an orderly, step-by-step evacuation
by the Germans.
The German armies depended for supply (and would have
to depend for evacuation) primarily on the railroad running from Cologne
through Liege, Namur, and Maubeuge. Another line ran from Coblenz up
the Moselle Valley to Luxembourg and Virton, and a third ran southward
along the west bank of the Rhine River to Strasbourg and thence northwestward
to Metz. The great lateral railroad was the Bruges-GhentMaubeuge-Mezieres-Metz
line, from which branches ran to the fighting front. The key rail junctions
were Aulnoye and Mezieres, and the loss of these places would deprive
the Germans of their principal capabilities for withdrawal. Foch's general
plan, then, was to capture both junctions rapidly by means of two major
converging offensives. One offensive, mainly British, was to drive eastward
to Aulnoye; the other, mainly American, was to drive northward to Mezieres
and Sedan.
For his final offensive, Foch had 220 divisions: 102
French, 60 British, 42 American, 12 Belgian, 2 Italian, and 2 Portuguese.
Besides having twice as many infantry troops as the other divisions,
the American divisions were at full strength, while the other Allied
divisions were below strength. On the line were 160 divisions; 60 were
held in reserve. To oppose the Allied offensive the Germans had 197
divisions: 113 in line and 84 in reserve. Only 51 of these divisions
were classified by the Allies as effective fighting units, however,
and all were under strength. News from a disillusioned home front further
depressed the already low morale of the German troops. Ludendorff braced
his forces as best he could for the impending blows. Special counterattack
divisions, composed of selected men and better armed and equipped than
the other divisions, were kept in reserve to counter any Allied breakthrough.
Though Foch intended a sort of pincers operation with a British-French
pincer moving from the west and an American-French pincer moving from
the south, his plan provided for aggressive action by all of the 160
front-line divisions. "Tout le monde a la bataille" ("Everyone
in the fight") was his expressive description of the offensive.
Fully aware of the scarcity of the German reserves, he planned to stagger
his attacks in order to confuse the enemy and keep him off balance.
Should the German reserves be directed to counter one Allied attack,
subsequent attacks elsewhere might find easy going. Foch had employed
this scheme of staggered attacks in the Aisne-Marne offensive with excellent
results.
The offensive was to be initiated on September 26 by
the southern pincer (the American First Army, with the French Fourth
Army on its left), with Mezieres-Sedan as its objective. The western
pincer would begin its attack toward Aulnoye on September 27 with the
British First and Third armies. The British Fourth and French First
armies, to the south, would join the attack on September 29, with the
French First Army on the right. The French Fifth and Tenth armies were
to advance in the center between the French First and Fourth armies
in order to maintain pressure on that front and prevent the movement
of German troops to other sectors. It was hoped also that these troops
would be trapped by the converging pincers. In the Flanders area three
armies-the Belgian, French Sixth, and British Second-under King Albert
I would attack toward Ghent on September 28. The British Fifth Army
was to cover the gap between King Albert's and Haig's army groups. The
remainder of the western front, south of the American First Army, was
held by Gen. Edouard de Curieres de Castelnau's French army group, with
the French Eighth Army adjacent to the Americans. Castelnau's forces
were to play only a defensive role in the offensive.
The grouping of forces for the final offensive indicates
the degree of mutual confidence and cooperation among the Allies under
Foch. French troops served enthusiastically under British, Belgian,
and American command; British, under French and Belgian command; and
Americans (6 divisions), under French and British command. In fact,
there was greater harmony among commanders of different nationalities
than among those of the same.
For simplicity and continuity in tracing the complex
operations of the many Allied armies, they are classified here into
four groupings. From north to south these are the Flanders offensive,
the western pincer ( Cambrai-St.Quentin), the operations of the French
center, and the southern pincer (Meuse-Argonne). The operations are
further divided into two time periods: September 26-October 31, and
November 1-11.
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