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Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision
Allied Final Offensive
1. Foch's
Plan
2. Operations, September 26-October 31.
a. Southern Pincer (Meuse-Argonne)
b. Western Pincer (Cambrai-St.-Quentin)
c. Flanders offensive
d. Operations of the French
Center
3. German
Situation
4. Allied
Operations, November 1-11
a. Allied Attacks from the South
b. Allied Attacks from the West
5. The
Armistice
6. Occupation
of Germany
Operations, September 26-October 31
The mission of the American First Army, as stated by
Foch, was to drive the enemy behind the SedanMezieres rail line before
winter weather made offensive operations difficult. The French Fourth
Army would attack on the American left. Both armies would effect a junction
north of Grandpre, at the northern end of the Argonne Forest. Before
the offensive could be launched, 220,000 men of the French Second Army
had to be moved from the Meuse-Argonne sector, while 600,000 American
troops moved in from the St.Mihiel front and from the rear. Through
remarkable staff work the move was accomplished smoothly and expeditiously.
Because of the short interval between the end of the St.-Mihiel offensive
and the contemplated final drive, however, most of the experienced American
divisions could not be brought up in time to lead the Meuse-Argonne
attack. Consequently, of the 9 divisions that were to take part in the
initial attack, 5 had not been previously engaged in combat and 4 did
not have their own artillery.
An advance in the Meuse-Argonne sector posed a serious
threat to the entire German position on the western front. The Germans
therefore had carefully fortified the zone during the four years they
had occupied it. Three main lines of defense had been thoroughly organized,
and almost every wood and village between them had been fortified as
a strong point. In addition, every possible route of advance was covered
by Germans on dominating ridges, and the rugged and thickly wooded hills
of the Argonne Forest themselves provided strong obstacles.
At 5:25 A.M. on September 26, after a preliminary bombardment,
Gen. Henri J. E. Gouraud's Fourth French Army advanced, and five minutes
later Pershing's American First Army moved forward. The French advance
was hampered by mine craters and shell holes, which had been created
during the operations of previous years, and by strong German positions
on the commanding heights. It had progressed only 3 miles by the evening
of September 27; by October 1, after three days of bitter fighting,
Gouraud had advanced 6 additional miles; by October 9, his offensive
had gained only another mile and a half. Meanwhile, the American assault
on September 26 had encountered only 4 German divisions on the front
line. By evening the surprised Germans had been beaten back 5 miles
along the Meuse but only 2 miles in the difficult Argonne Forest. The
advance continued until October 1, but meanwhile German resistance had
stiffened. Although the first two German positions had been broken,
the American effort spent itself before reaching the third position.
After the relief of units and reorganization the attacks were resumed
on October 4.
The next four weeks saw a grueling series of frontal
attacks, during which the Americans beat their way through the third
German defensive position as casualties mounted rapidly. Meanwhile,
Pershing launched an offensive across the Meuse to clear the heights
on the east bank. This sector was turned over to the newly formed American
Second Army, under Lt. Gen. Robert L. Bullard. Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett
was given command of the First Army, and Pershing thereafter acted as
army group commander. By October 31, the Argonne Forest had been cleared;
and the Americans had advanced 10 miles beyond their starting line of
September 26. Gouraud's Fourth Army had broken through the desolated
area on its front into open ground and by October 31 had reached the
Aisne River, 20 miles from its starting points.
The slow though steady progress of the American First
Army during this phase of the battle was highly unsatisfactory to Clemenceau,
who suggested to Foch that he try to have Pershing relieved of command.
Foch, however, had "a more comprehensive knowledge of the difficulties
encountered by the American Army," and declined to support such
action. As a matter of fact, the American First Army was accomplishing
far more than its limited territorial gains indicated. The threat of
its slow but persistent advance had alarmed Ludendorff, who eventually
sent 27 of his precious reserve divisions to the American front, thereby
facilitating the progress of the other Allied offensives.
Western Pincer (Cambrai-St.-Quentin)
Four Allied armies were poised to move eastward on the
Cambrai-St.-Quentin front. From north to south these were the British
First (Horne), Third (Byng), and Fourth (Rawlinson) armies and the French
First Army (Debeney) . The British First and Third armies were to attack
on September 27, one day after the attack of the southern pincer; the
Fourth and French First armies would move out on September 29, in consonance
with Foch's plan of staggered attacks. Between Haig's armies and their
objective, Aulnoye, lay canals, rivers, and German defensive positions,
including in the southern sector the formidable Hindenburg Line with
its three deep defensive positions. At dawn on September 27, the British
First and Third armies began their offensive without preliminary bombardment
in order to gain surprise. The attacks progressed according to plan
but not as rapidly as had been anticipated; by the night of September
28, they had broken through the German defenses to a depth of 6 miles.
This success, plus the American early successes on the Meuse-Argonne
front, convinced Ludendorff of eventual German defeat. On the night
of September 28, he reported to Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg that
there was no chance of an improvement in the German situation, and that
efforts to obtain an armistice should be begun. The following day, Hindenburg
reported to his government that "the situation demands an immediate
armistice in order to avert a catastrophe." On October 4, German
and Austrian notes proposing an armistice were forwarded to President
Woodrow Wilson.
Meanwhile, on the morning of September 29, Rawlinson's
Fourth Army joined the attack, with Debeney's First French Army advancing
on its right as flank protection. An intensive bombardment had been
started on the night of September 27 along the Fourth Army's front,
and it had been continued through the night of September 28. This lengthy
bombardment was necessary because the attack had to be made across the
St.-Quentin Canal, and tanks could not precede the infantry in the assault.
Artillery had to be employed to soften the German defenses, preparatory
to forcing the canal. The effect of this sustained bombardment was to
drive the Germans deep into their shelters and to prevent the delivery
of food and ammunition to the front-line troops. Moreover, since most
of the German troops on the line were either new conscripts or recent
arrivals from the eastern front, the demoralizing effect of the bombardment
was great. In a determined attack, British, Australian, and American
troops hurled themselves at the tunnel defenses and swam the canal.
The ferocity of the attack panicked the Germans, who abandoned their
machine guns and positions and fled to the rear. By nightfall the Fourth
Army had captured the advanced position of the Hindenburg Line and a
good part of the second position. All three British armies were now
engaged in a slow but inexorable advance. On September 30, Cambrai was
enveloped on the north and south, but the Germans were not cleared from
the town until October 9. St.-Quentin was flanked by the Fourth Army,
evacuated by the Germans, and occupied by the French First Army on October
1-2. By October 5, the third and last position of the Hindenburg Line
was in British hands. With his front giving way, Ludendorff withdrew
his forces to a new position along the line of the Selle River. His
special counterattack divisions had proved ineffective not only because
they were too few in number, but also because the frontline troops in
assaulted areas would not hold positions long enough to permit their
arrival.
The Allies moved to the line of the Selle, and on October
17 the British Fourth and French First armies attacked the German positions
from Le Gateau southward. The German troops, exhorted by appeals to
hold fast in defense of the fatherland, fought well, but after two days
of bitter combat they withdrew before the two Allied armies. At 2 A.M.
on October 20, the British First and Third armies attacked the northern
sector of the Selle position. The infantry crossed the river and, assisted
by tanks, assaulted the high ground along the east bank. Again the Germans
fought stubbornly, but they were eventually driven off. The three British
armies and the French First Army on their right continued the advance
through seas of mud, hampered by German mines and demolitions. By the
end of October they had reached the next German position, which lay
behind the Scheldt River and extended southward to the vicinity of Laon.
Flanders offensive
King Albert's army group was to attack on September
28, the day between Haig's assaults of September 27 and 29. The offensive
of his three armies (from north to south, the Belgian, French Sixth,
and British Second armies) began well despite persistent heavy rains.
By October 1, the advance had progressed 8 miles and had succeeded in
recapturing the Ypres Ridge. The grave threat of Haig's attack to the
south had influenced Ludendorff to send reserves to that area. These
were few, and, forced to make a choice, he decided to draw troops from
the Flanders front. Some 5 German divisions were left in Flanders, and
these their commander said would "no longer stand up to a serious
attack." The principal obstacle to the Allied advance in Flanders
was rain, which made the limited road net almost impassable and bogged
down supply and transportation systems. The impasse. lasted for two
weeks, and it was not until October 14 that serious operations could
be resumed. On October 20, the Lys River was reached. By October 28,
the successes of Haig's armies in the Selle battles had forced a general
German withdrawal, and Albert's armies advanced that day without serious
opposition to the German position on the Scheldt. Though not as strenuously
engaged as the troops in the two principal offensives, the king's army
group played its role well in the execution of the over-all plan.
Operations of the French Center
Four French armies participated in the offensive in
the sector between Haig's British and Pershing's American armies. The
role of the French First Army at the right of the British advance and
that of the French Fourth Army on the American left have been described.
Between these two armies the line was held by the Fifth and Tenth armies,
whose task was to harass the enemy on their fronts, prevent their movement
to other fronts, and hamper their withdrawal so that they might be trapped
by the British and American pincers. This relatively passive assignment
was an odd one for Frenchmen who had been imbued with Foch's philosophy
of "l'attaque, toujours l'attaque" ("keep on the offensive")
-a philosophy which, under Gen. Joseph Joffre's skillful guidance in
1914, had turned the tide at the Marne after two heartbreaking weeks
of retreat and had led the French to a brilliant victory; and which,
conversely, in the hands of the obstinate and pompous Nivelle, had led
brave Frenchmen to disaster at the Aisne in 1917, with consequent demoralization
and mutiny in the French Army. Nevertheless, the French played their
unusual role well, but the pincers did not close, and by October 31
the Germans in the center had withdrawn to a shortened line. This shortening
of the line required fewer French troops in this section of the front,
and some were withdrawn and formed into a new Tenth Army (the old Tenth
Army remained in position, but was renamed the Third). The new army
was sent to the Lorraine front, to the right of the Americans, where,
with the French Eighth Army, it was to engage in an offensive northward
on both sides of Metz. This offensive was scheduled for November 15,
but the armistice on November 11 made it unnecessary.
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