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Western Front: 1918: The Year of Decision
Reduction of the German Salients
1. Aisne-Marne Offensive, July
18-August 61
2. Reduction
of the Amiens Salient, August 8 - September 3
3. St.Mihiel
Offensive, September 12-16
Aisne-Marne Offensive, July 18-August 61
(This offensive and the Champagne-Marne offensive of
July 15-17 together are often referred to as the Second Battle of the
Marne)
Short Summary:
REDUCTION OF THE MARNE SALIENT (Aisne Marne offensive;
July 18 - Aug. 6, 1918). General (later Marshal) Ferdinand Foch planned
to launch a general offensive as soon as the German drives had spent
themselves. First, however, it was necessary to reduce several salients
occupied by the Germans which restricted Allied lateral communications
along the front. The Marne salient, created during the third German
drive, was attacked by Allied forces, predominately French, from three
sides in July. In a brilliant operation the Allies forced the Germans
back to the Vesle and Aisne rivers, thus straightening the front
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As early as May 20, Foch had planned a counteroffensive
to seize the initiative from Germany. His opportunity came with the
failure of the fifth German drive. In preparation for a general offensive,
he planned to reduce the three prominent German salients so as to improve
lateral railway communications along the Allied front and facilitate
future operations. The three salients were the Marne salient, created
during the third German drive; the Amiens salient, formed during the
first German drive; and the St.-Mihiel salient, formed in the autumn
of 1914 and relatively quiet ever since. Foch's first objective was
the Marne salient, although it was difficult to assemble promptly the
means for an offensive there. Haig was called on to provide some of
his reserves and responded generously despite the objections of the
British cabinet, which was fearful of reducing British strength in Flanders
to a dangerous level.
Foch's plan was to attack the Marne salient from all
sides. Four French armies were to engage in the offensive; in counterclockwise
order these were Gen. Charles Mangin's Tenth and Gen. Jean M. J. Degoutte's
Sixth armies, in the western half of the salient; and Gen. Marie Antoine
Henry de Mitry's Ninth and Gen. Henri M. Berthelot's Fifth armies, in
the eastern half. Included in these armies were 8 American, 4 British,
and 2 Italian divisions. Mangin was to make the main assault. Early
on July 18, he struck with 20 divisions (including 2 American and 2
British) and 350 tanks. An hour later, Degoutte joined the attack on
Mangin's south flank, and by nightfall the Tenth and Sixth armies had
advanced from 2 to 5 miles. (This was the greatest and most successful
use of tanks by the French during the war.) On July 19, Mangin continued
to advance toward Soissons and the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road, the
vital artery of the German salient, although more difficult terrain
and mechanical failures were beginning to render the tanks less effective.
Modest gains were made by the other French armies on this day.
Alarmed by Mangin's threat against the key communications
center of Soissons, the Germans decided to withdraw from the Marne salient.
The withdrawal was conducted skillfully and in good order. The Germans
delayed at successive positions, defending each resolutely while evacuating
supplies and equipment to the rear, until the pressure of the Allied
attacks compelled them to retreat. By August 3, they had withdrawn to
a strong position at the base of the salient behind the Vesle and Aisne
rivers, where they held fast. On the morning of August 6, 2 American
divisions attacked this position. Minor gains were scored, but it was
not broken. The Marne salient had been eliminated; the French had gained
a glorious victory, but they did not forget to express their gratitude
for the help of their British and American allies. This, the first significant
Allied success of the year, brought relief in the Allied homelands;
Paris was jubilant. On August 6, Foch received his baton as a marshal
of France.
The largest American contingent thus far had participated
in the operation. For the first time, American divisions were formed
into corps. Near the end of the battle the American 1st and 3d corps
held the entire front of the French Sixth Army. American divisions had
been used as spearheads in the offensive and had performed in a manner
to gain praise from their allies. A total of 8 American divisions had
been engaged in the offensive, but the number does not indicate the
true magnitude of American participation. Each division, comprising
28,000 men, had twice the infantry strength of a British, French, or
German division. The organization of the American division has been
criticized by many ( including Americans), but its huge size did give
it integral power for sustained operations, thereby necessitating fewer
shifts of divisions between front and rear-a distinct advantage in the
warfare of the times in France.
German losses in the Aisne-Marne offensive were heavy
but not ruinous. What was more important, the initiative had now passed
to the Allies, where it would remain until the end of the war. Ludendorff's
cherished Flanders offensive had become a dream, and it was clear that
his hope of crushing the Allies before the United States could put a
large force in the field would not be realized.
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