WW1 POSTERS

9. Italian Front

a. Strategic Considerations
b. Initial Operations
c. First Four Battles of the Isonzo
d. Fifth Battle of the Isonzo
e. Austrian Asiago Offensive (May 15-June 17, 1916)
f. Sixth to Eleventh Battles of the Isonzo
g. Battle of Caporetto (Oct. 24-Nov. 12, 1917)
h. Battle of the Piave ( June 15-24, 1918)
i. Battle of Vittorio Veneto (Oct. 24-Nov. 4, 1918)
j. General Commentary

Sixth to Eleventh Battles of the Isonzo

After the failure of the Austrian Asiago offensive, Cadorna rapidly began to return his troops by rail and motor to the Isonzo front. The Austrians, who had to move from the Trentino over a longer, less efficient route, were at a disadvantage. As a result, when Cadorna launched the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo ( also known as the Battle of Gorizia; Aug. 6-17, 1916), his operations met with immediate success. Both Gorizia and the bastion of Monte San Michele, dominating the northern section of the Carso, were captured. Threatened now from the north, the Austrians on the Carso fell back. Stiffening resistance and the lack of adequate reserve to force a real breakthrough, however, brought the offensive to a halt. This battle had given the Italians their first real gains of the war; nevertheless, nothing decisive had been achieved.

Subsequent Italian military actions took on political aims to aggravate the "moral crisis" of the Dual Monarchy through a relentless wearing down of its forces that might eventually lead to internal collapse. Since Austria considered the retention of Trieste (Triest) vital, the Italians saw in the capture of that Adriatic city the opening wedge toward the downfall of the Habsburg Empire. The plan was to reach the city, which lay only 30 miles behind the front, by a succession of well-timed, energetic, limitedobjective attacks punctuated by well-planned respites to prevent unnecessary losses, thus approaching the major objective by bounds. To this end the Seventh (September 14-17), Eighth (October 10-12), and Ninth (November 1-4) battles of the Isonzo were initiated. The theory was sound, but in practice (and in large part due to the growing insufficiency of artillery) the attacks developed into the same drawn-out and blood affairs that had formerly characterized fighting on that front. Notable local successes were achieved, but not much progress was made toward the larger goal. The three offensives did disturb the Austrian commander on the Isonzo front, Gen. (later Field Marshal) Baron Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna, who requested reinforcements, adding, "The last three battles have shown that the enemy has learned his lessons well and is taking advantage of all past experience in utilizing to the full modern techniques of war." For the Italian soldiers, who knew little of the tremendous strain under which the Austrians were operating, however, these battles seemed disproportionate in terms of results and sacrifices, of victories and losses, and of the means employed and the results attained.

Efforts to refurbish the Italian Army in the autumn of 1916 and the succeeding winter brought imposing results. A total of 16 new divisions were put in the field, and 6 additional divisions were being made ready; medium artillery was doubled, and heavy artillery was increased fourfold; the number of machine guns, which at the start of the war had been only 600, was brought to 8,200; a gigantic acceleration in the production of bombs was being spurred; and military aircraft, which had numbered 382 in 1915, were now increased to 3,860, with great improvements in speed, striking capacity, and logistical potential. Early in 1917, Cadorna felt confident enough to resume offensive operations. It had been agreed by the Allies that their efforts in the spring of 1917 would be coordinated. Accordingly, the British attacked at Arras on April 9, the French drove forward on the Aisne on April 16, and the Italians took the offensive in the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo on May 12. This offensive was planned as two coordinated flanking attacks, first against the Bainsizza barrier and later against the Carso. The operations developed into the same exasperating pattern as had the engagements of the preceding autumn. After great losses the battle was halted on May 28. On June 4, a surprise Austrian counterattack deprived the Italians of a number of hard-won positions; the battle ended on June 8.

Cadorna now turned to a limited offensive on the eastern face of the Trentino salient, between the Valsugana (Suganatal) and Asiago, where he employed 12 divisions and 24 Alpine battalions on a 10-mile front. Under the misnomer of the Battle of the Ortigara, the engagement lasted from June 10 to 29. The battle turned into a Carso-like struggle of attrition waged at an altitude of 6,500 feet. There were initial and occasional brilliant successes, but no major results were attained, and Italian losses were enormous.

This might have been the moment to suspend operations to permit the troops to recoup their strength. The Allies kept pressing for a new offensive, however, and Cadorna was eager to gain a better defensive line, at least on the Isonzo. Concentrating on the river such a mass of men and materiel as had never been seen on that front (51 divisions with 5,200 pieces of artillery), he launched the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo (August 19-September 12). The Second Army was to gain the Bainsizza Plateau, officially described as "a transitional objective and zone of maneuver opening the way to the capture of the Ternova [Ternova] Plateau." The Third Army was to attack the Carso and seize the dominating Hermada and the surrounding plateau. Diversionary actions were planned for the north as far as Tolmino.

The Third Army attack came to nothing, and on September 4 a powerful Austrian counterattack hurled the Italians once again down the slopes of the Hermada. The Second Army attack failed in its principal purpose through the intransigence of its commander, Gen. Luigi Capello, who converted the diversionary action against Tolmino into the main attack and obstinately continued it even after it had failed. Since the reserve had been allotted for his use, it was lost to the general action. Instead of a single, coordinated offensive with alternating pressures and judicious use of the reserve, three separate and distinct actions had resulted: at Tolmino, for the Bainsizza, and on the Carso.

The Italian offensives of 1917 had gained notable local tactical successes, including a fivemile penetration into the strongest Austrian defenses. Nevertheless, the pivotal points of the Austrian defense line remained in enemy hands: Tolmino, Monte San Gabriele, and the Hermada. Italian losses had been staggering; once again, and to a greater extent than ever, fatigue, weariness, and frustration gripped the Italian troops, making them prey to an unscrupulous neutralist and defeatist propaganda mercilessly exploited at home and abroad.