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9. Italian Fronta. Strategic Considerations
Battle of Caporetto (Oct. 24-Nov. 12, 1917)After the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo, the Austrians on that front were at the point of collapse and might well have succumbed to another offensive. Emperor Charles I now requested the replacement of Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian and Rumanian fronts by Germans, so that he might throw the entire weight of his armed forces against the Italians. The German High Command felt, however, that the war would be decided on the western front. An offensive against Italy at this time would be justified only if it could definitely knock her out of the war; otherwise, it would merely lead the Austrians to abandon their present excellent defensive positions and perhaps necessitate redeployments to less favorable ones. Nevertheless, the Germans agreed to intervene on the Italian front with a limited number of crack troops fully suported by artillery, air forces, and logistical services. A quick resolute blow was envisioned that would throw the Italians back beyond the Isonzo and, if possible, behind the Tagliamento, in order to afford the Austrians some respite and time to prepare for a victory offensive at a future propitious moment. For this purpose the Austro-German Fourteenth Army was organized from seven German divisions (including the powerful Alpenkorps) and eight Austrian divisions, Gen. Otto von Below,.of western front fame, was given its command. By September 18, Cadorna had become convinced that an Austro-German offensive was impending on the Isonzo. On that date he ordered his Second Army (General Capello) and Third Army (Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Aosta) to assume defensive positions in depth and brace for attack. Having issued the order, he took no measures to supervise its execution, as is incumbent on a commander in chief, nor did he issue any directive for the defensive battle. Meanwhile, the offensive-minded Capello dreamed of a counteroffensive in the Tolmino area and neglected to prepare his defensive position. Cadorna, who spent the time until October 19 inspecting other fronts, was generally out of touch with the activities of his forces on the Isonzo. When he and Capello finally bestirred themselves to reinforce the left flank of the Second Army, it was too late. Before dawn on Oct. 24, 1917, an intense and effective bombardment fell on the Italian lines. First gas and then high-explosive shells were used. The Italian gas masks offered little protection against the gas, and panic seized the troops. At 8 A.M., the Fourteenth Army moved forward on a line from Tolmino to Plezzo (Flitsch; now Bovec), concealed by a heavy mist that blanketed observation from the heights. Capello had 25 divisions with which to oppose von Below's 15 divisions, but they were under strength, poorly distributed, and in inadequate defensive positions. Using their new tactics of infiltration and relentless pressure, the Germans shattered the front of the Second Army. By evening of October 25, it was clear that a retreat was imperative; Cadorna did not issue the order until October 27, thereby losing two precious days. It was anticipated that at least a temporary stand would be made behind the Tagliamento, but when the enemy crossed the river near Cornino to the north the Tagliamento position became untenable. On November 4, Cadorna ordered a further withdrawal to the Piave. Many troops had been cut off, particularly those of the Carnic Corps, but the Isonzo forces, covered by an excellent cavalry rear guard, reached the strong line of the Piave by November 10. This Caporetto disaster (sometimes called the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo) cost the Italians 320,000 casualties in killed, wounded, and prisoners and several thousand guns. Meanwhile, General Cadorna was replaced by Gen. (later Marshal) Armando Diaz. The line of the Piave was organized with the Fourth Army on the left and the Third on the right, while the broken Second Army attempted to reorganize in the rear. A force of 11 Anglo-French divisions, hastily rushed from the western front to Italy, constituted a general reserve, which Cadorna had so sadly neglected. Of the 65 Italian divisions available prior to Caporetto, only 33 divisions were now at full efficiency (4 or 5 others were still partially serviceable). Pitted against them were 50 Austro-German divisions and 4,500 cannon. As the so-called law of Clausewitz (originated by the Prussian Karl von Clausewitz) had forseen, however, the Austro-German offensive had been reduced in power as it advanced in space. The very speed of the advance had out stripped the capacity of the bridge engineers and other essential logistical services. The Austro-German forces persisted in their efforts to force crossings of the Piave and destroy the Italian Army until December 26, but they were consistently repulsed. Particularly fierce attacks were thrown against stubborn Italian defenders on Monte Grappa but to no avail. Regarding the fight on the Grappa, Gen. Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, German chief of staff of the Fourteenth Army, later wrote: "Thus our offensive was brought to a standstill short of its objectives, an offensive which had been so rich in expectations and hopes, and the Grappa became the `Sacred Mountain' of the Italians. They can be rightly proud that they held it against the heroic efforts of the best troops of both the Austro-Hungarian Army and their German comrades." The resurgence of the Italian Army and the home, front after Caporetto was truly remarkable. The disaster strengthened the determination of the Italian people; the entire nation at last began to support the war effort. In a few months industry replaced all of the artillery materiel losses, and the supply of munitions was considerably increased. The army proved to be still sound, and during the winter of 1917-1918 it further recovered its strength with marvelous speed. The place of the Second Army was taken by the Fifth Army, which for the moment at least served as the chief reserve of the supreme command. In the meantime, measures were taken to minister to the physical needs and restore the battered morale of the Italian soldier. General Diaz possessed a more humane sense of the soldier's life than Cadorna did, for under the uniform he saw the man and the citizen. New organizational methods for defense and offensive were developed which sought maximum results with a minimum loss of life. Greater emphasis was placed on the use of airpower, intelligence and information services were overhauled, and a central agency was formed to engage in counterpropaganda against the enemy. There was one other important result of the Caporetto
affair. High Allied officials gathered in conference at Rapallo and
agreed to form an Allied Supreme War Council to coordinate the activities
in all the theaters. This was the first step toward Allied unified command,
which eventually materialized under Gen. (later Marshal) Ferdinand Foch.
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