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The War in the Air
Tactics
In the early months of World War I airplanes were commonly
employed as scouts, with varying success. As they sought out the enemy's
forces, they often passed enemy planes bound on similar missions. At
first, pilots and observers might wave to opposing crews as they met,
if not as a greeting, at least in recognition. It was soon realized,
however, that these missions were important to the enemy's operations
and should be opposed. Aviators began to arm themselves with odd collections
of rifles, shotguns, and pistols and to make clumsy efforts to intercept
and destroy enemy aircraft. Improvement of airplanes and weapons made
these clashes increasingly deadly, and fighter aircraft tactics rapidly
became the largest phase of air operations.
As fighter planes took an increasing toll of the slower
observation planes, the latter were sent out under the escort of friendly
fighters. In early 1916, however, the French discovered that their fighters
could be more effectively employed on offensive patrols over the enemy's
lines to search out, surprise, and shoot down the enemy fighters-and
even, if possible, to attack German forward airdromes. By thus gaining
local air superiority and keeping the enemy on the defensive, the French
fighters enabled their observation planes to operate freely without
escorts. During the Battle of the Somme that same year the British employed
this technique aggressively and systematically and achieved outstanding
success.
The actual tactics of these air battles were quite simple.
Underpowered and fragile, the planes of the period had an inconvenient
tendency to come apart if subjected to violent maneuvering. Successful
pilots usually sought to gain altitude, diving "from out of the
sun" on enemy aircraft passing below them and trusting to speed
and surprise. Planes patrolled singly or in small groups, attacking
any enemy aircraft encountered in their assigned area.
The size of the tactical units involved in these operations
grew steadily, if slowly. In this, as in so many other aspects of air
warfare, the methodical Germans seem to have set the pace, employing
strong units of picked fighter pilots-such as Richthof en's famous,
gaudily painted circus-at critical points. By 1918 formations of 50
fighters were not uncommon. A clash between two such groups could lead
to a wild, scrambling dogfight-a mass of confused individual engagements
in which each fighter sought to get "on the tail of" (behind)
his opponent.
Initially, as previously mentioned, squadrons were assigned
to armies and so were tied to their areas of operations. During the
later stages commanders on both sides began to realize that the inherent
mobility of aircraft permitted their concentration at the decisive point
of the battle, and accordingly would assemble all available air strength
to support the divisions spearheading the attack. As an example, the
American St.-Mihiel offensive was supported by both the British Independent
Air Force and the French Aviation Division, as well as by American,
Italian, and Portuguese aircraft. Once the operation had been successfully
concluded, most of these planes were shifted to other sectors of the
front to support other operations.
The observation planes naturally worked more closely
with the ground forces than did the fighter planes. The devleopment
of effective aerial cameras enabled army commanders to keep constantly
abreast of changes in the enemy's defenses and dispositions. Eventually
thousands of aerial photographs were distributed to infantry divisions
to replace outdated maps. Likewise the development of radio equipment
greatly improved air-ground communications and made it possible for
air observers to direct artillery fire effectively. Since artillery
fire was the backbone of both offensive and defensive operations during
this period, the importance of this service can easily be appreciated.
In this mission the airplane was effectively supplemented by the captive
observation balloon. Though unable to attain the height to which observation
planes could climb or to fly over enemy-held territory, the balloon
had the advantages of a fixed position (which enabled its observer to
orient himself more exactly) and of direct telephonic communication
with the artillery units it served. The natural vulnerability of its
big bag of inflammable hydrogen gas was at least partially compensated
for by emplacing it in a ring of antiaircraft weapons.
During 1917-1918 a new aerial technique, commonly known
as the attack mission, appeared. Besides gaining air superiority in
the skies above the battlefield, fighter aircraft were made responsible
for attacks with machine gun fire and light bombs against enemy ground
forces. Attack aviation was frequently employed against the enemy trench
system in support of assaults by friendly infantry. It was very effective
against troops and vehicles caught in railroad yards or on the march.
If the enemy were retreating through rough country where frequent defiles
made it difficult for his troops to deploy off the road, the results
could be devastating. In 1918, Italian and British aircraft mauled the
Austro-Hungarian forces retreating after their defeat at Vittorio Veneto.
French fliers pounded the retreating Bulgarians in the Balkans, and
Allenby's air force broke up large elements of the Turkish troops retreating
before him in Palestine. Possibly, however, the greatest success of
attack aviation occurred in March 1918, when all possible Allied aviation
was committed (as the only mobile reserve available) to check the victorious
German columns following up the retreating British Fifth Army. Employed
energetically, Allied airmen gained time for Allied ground forces to
patch their broken front.
Though some military leaders had for years visualized
the possible use of aircraft as bombers, World War I bombing operations
were of relatively little importance. Neither satisfactory planes, bombs,
navigational instruments, nor bombsights were available. The bombing
planes employed were too slow and usually lacked sufficient range to
reach vital enemy targets. Despite the courage of the bomber crews,
neither day nor night raids met with outstanding success. The German
raids against the London area did force the withdrawal of some of the
best British fighter units from France for home defense, but the Germans
found their losses dishearteningly heavy. Bombing operations proved
most useful when directed at enemy communications close behind the front
during major ground offensives.
There were occasional instances of the air supply of
ground troops, both in dropping food and ammunition to cutoff units
and in the use of zeppelins or heavy bombers to move supplies to hard-to-reach
areas of Africa or Asia Minor.
In general, both sides learned that air superiority
was hard to win and was seldom complete. In 1917 and 1918, by securing
strong air support, Allenby was able to destroy the TurkishGerman air
units opposing him in Palestine and so to blind the Turkish ground forces.
This enemy aviation was weak numerically and qualitatively, however,
and was isolated beyond the hope of effective reinforcement. In contrast,
on the western front the Germans remained able even in 1918 to secure
local air superiority by hurriedly concentrating their remaining picked
fighter units.
In the air, as on the ground, retention of the initiative
proved decisive. Though ground commanders might protest, it was repeatedly
proved that better results could be obtained by concentrating friendly
aircraft for offensive action against enemy aircraft and airbases than
by parceling them out for the defense of assigned sectors of the front.
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