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Diplomatic History of World War 1:
Negotiations During the War
1. Japanese
Intervention
2. Turkish
Intervention
3. Italy's
Entry into the War
4. Bulgaria,
Rumania & Greece
5. Plans for Partition of the Ottoman Empire
a. Constantinople Agreement
b. Egypt
c. Nejd Treaty and McMahon Letters
d. Sykes-Picot Agreement
e. St.-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement
Plans for Partition of the Ottoman Empire
Constantinople Agreement
During all this time the major Allies had been negotiating
among themselves about the postwar distribution of the Ottoman dominions.
The so-called Eastern question had occupied much of the attention of
European diplomats for most of a century and a half, and contrivance
had been piled on contrivance to keep the sultanate more or less intact.
With Turkey's entry into the war on the German and Austrian side, however,
statesmen in the Allied capitals concluded that the demolition of that
empire was inevitable. The Russian government had traditionally sought
free egress for Russian shipping from the Black Sea, and early in 1915
the czarist foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov, asked the British and
French to agree in principle that after the war Russia should have control
over the Turkish straits. Though British governments in the past had
held to the conviction that Russia should be barred from the eastern
Mediterranean, the London cabinet quickly agreed that this position
would not be tenable after the war. Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey
issued cautious statements to prepare public opinion for a reversal
of the policy; then on March 12, 1915, he signed a secret convention
with the Russian ambassador in London, according Russia the right to
control Constantinople and the Turkish straits after the war, provided
that "the aspirations of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman
Empire as well as in other regions are realized." On April 12,
the French foreign minister, Theophile Delcasse, signed a similar convention
with the Russian ambassador in Paris. As we have seen, the secret Treaty
of London, concluded in the same month, provided that Italy should have
Antalya if the Ottoman dominions were divided among the Allies.
Egypt
For the British and French, the chief problem was to
draw up arrangements for the areas south of Turkey proper that were
nominally under Ottoman control-the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian
Peninsula. After Turkey's entry into the war, the Allies had been alarmed
over the possibility of the sultan's arousing the Muslim world in a
crusade against Christians. In part to prepare for such a contingency,
in part to counter an expected Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal,
the British government decided in November 1914 to end the fiction that
their high commissioner in Cairo was merely an adviser to the Egyptian
government, to proclaim a protectorate over Egypt, and to proceed to
formal annexation of that land. Getting wind of this plan, the French
protested that they should be entitled to do likewise in Morocco, but
that Muslim unrest in that area made it impossible to do so, and that
both allies should thus refrain from any immediate steps toward enlarging
their empires. The British did go on to proclaim a protectorate over
Egypt on Dec. 18, 1914, and to depose the proTurkish khedive, Abbas
II Hilmi, but desisted from annexation.
Nejd Treaty and McMahon Letters
Meanwhile, in the Ottoman dominions themselves British
agents entered into separate and uncoordinated negotiations with Muslim
leaders, endeavoring to detach them from the leadership of Sultan Mohammed
V. The government of India sent first Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear, the
consul at Kuwait, and then Sir Percy Cox, the resident in the Persian
Gulf, to negotiate a treaty with Sheikh ibn-Saud. Signed on Dec. 26,
1915, this treaty recognized ibn-Saud as independent ruler of the Nejd
and its dependencies, promised him defense, and granted him a subsidy
in return for his friendly neutrality. The government of Egypt at the
same time entered into correspondence with Husayn (Hussein), the sherif
of Mecca. In a series of letters exchanged in 1915 and 1916, Sir Arthur
Henry McMahon, the high commissioner in Cairo, promised Husayn "the
independence of the Arabs" from the 37th parallel south, except
for the coastal region "lying to the .west of the districts of
Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo." In return, the sherif agreed
to be advised exclusively by representatives of the British government
and to give Britain administrative privileges in the vicinity of Baghdad
and Basra. Vague though their language was, these letters obviously
contradicted the assurance given to Husayn's rival, ibn-Saud, and when
Husayn on June 5, 1916, proclaimed an Arab revolt against the Turks
and on Oct. 29, 1916, declared himself king of the Arabs, the British
cabinet had to announce with some embarrassment that it could only recognize
him as king of the Hejaz.
Sykes-Picot Agreement
By that time, furthermore, the whole situation had been
complicated even further by an Anglo-French agreement which was consistent
neither with the Nejd treaty nor with the McMahon-Husayn letters. After
signing the straits agreements with Russia in March and April 1915,
the two western European allies had commenced negotiations to define
their "aspirations...in the Ottoman Empire." Sir Mark Sykes
acted for Britain; Georges Picot, for France. By the spring of 1916
the two negotiators had arrived at an understanding, the Russian government
had given its approval, and a formal SykesPicot agreement was. signed
on May 16. It provided that Russia should receive, in addition to the
straits, the Armenian provinces of TurkeyErzurum, Trebizond, Van, and
Bitlis-and northern Kurdistan along the line Mus-Siirt-`Amadiya to the
Persian border. France was to have Cilicia -that is, the area west of
the Armenian provinces and south of the line Ala Dag-Kayseri-Ak DagYildiz
Dag-Egin (now Kemaliya)-Kharput-and the Syrian coast inland to Damascus,
Horns, Hama, and Aleppo and south to the area of Haifa. Britain was
to have Haifa and Acre on the coast and all of southern Mesopotamia,
including Baghdad, while the area between the British and French holdings
was to be divided into a zone of French influence covering the Syrian
hinterland to Mosul and a British zone from there southward. Alexandretta
(now Iskenderun) was to become a free port, and Palestine was to be
internationalized. Though the agreement made provision for one or more
independent Arab states in the zones of influence, the terms did not
accord with the pledges made either to Husayn or to ibnSaud. Partly
for this reason, the British and French endeavored to keep its provisions
secret.
St.-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement
Italy nevertheless acquired a general knowledge of the
Sykes-Picot understanding, and early in 1917 she asked for a supplementary
accord With the other Allies in order to make more precise the vague
clause about Turkish territory in the Treaty of London of 1915. On April.
17, 1917, the premiers of Britain, France, and Italy signed an agreement
providing that Italy should have the right to annex most of the Vilayet
of Konya, the sanjaks of Mentese (now Mu V la) , Antalya, and Ieel,
and the vilayet and city of Smyrna (now Izmir), and to have a sphere
of influence north of Smyrna. But this agreement stipulated that the
concurrence of Russia was required. Because of the revolution in Russia,
that concurrence was never obtained, and the agreement remained inoperative.
Aside from an informal understanding, reached by the British and French
premiers in December 1918, that Britain should have Mosul in return
for giving France a share in northern Mesopotamian oil, this St.-Jean-de-Maurienne
agreement was the last inter-Allied compact to touch on the future of
the Ottoman Empire.
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