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Diplomatic History of World War 1:
Negotiations During the War
1. Japanese
Intervention
2. Turkish
Intervention
3. Italy's Entry into the War
4. Bulgaria,
Rumania & Greece
5. Plans
for Partition of the Ottoman Empire
a. Constantinople Agreement
b. Egypt
c. Nejd Treaty and McMahon Letters
d. Sykes-Picot Agreement
e. St.-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement
Italy's Entry into the War
The great prize among European neutrals was Italy. With
Ger many and Austria-Hungary, it had been a partner in the Triple Alliance
(q.v. ), but for some time it had been drifting away from this tie.
When the war opened and the German and Austrian governments asked Italy
to join them, the Italian cabinet refused on the technical ground that
Article 7 of the alliance treaty required consultation and agreement
concerning any territorial change in the Balkan area, and that Vienna
had not consulted Rome before making demands on Serbia. On August 3,
the Italian government issued a proclamation of neutrality. From the
outset, however, it was evident that Italy would probably at some point
abandon this status and join either the Central Powers or the Allies.
Conservative and colonialist groups in the country favored the former,
reasoning that an Allied victory would strengthen liberalism in Italy,
give Britain total control of the Mediterranean Sea and thus check future
growth of the nation's African empire, and place Russia in such a commanding
position in the southern Balkans as to halt Italian expansion there.
Liberal, commercial, and nationalist groups leaned toward the Allies,
fearing that conflict with Britain would strangle Italian trade, and
believing that Italy's wisest policy was to seek the annexation of Austro-Hungarian
territories populated by Italians.
The prime minister, Antonio Salandra, was of the latter
view. As early as Sept. 30, 1914, he reported to King Victor Emmanuel
III that Italy's only real choices were to remain neutral or to join
the Allies, and that war against Germany and Austria-Hungary would be
the most profitable course, but that hostilities should not be opened
until spring, when the army would have had time to prepare for an offensive.
Salandra did not, however, have the full support of the Italian people
or even of a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. Three fourths of the
deputies were supporters of his predecessor, Giovanni Giolitti, who
for obscure reasons had resigned his office in March, and Giolitti was
not committed to the Allied cause. In public, therefore, Salandra confined
himself to declaring on October 18 that the government would be "uninfluenced
by any sentiment but that of an exclusive, unlimited devotion to our
country, a sacred egoism [sacro egoismo] for Italy," and on December
3 that it would maintain "an alert and armed neutrality."
For his part, Giolitti adopted a quasi-neutralist position, asserting
in January 1915 that "much [parecchio] may be obtained without
going to war." These rival slogans. "sacro egoismo" and
"parecchio," ornamented Italian partisan debate throughout
the winter of 1914-1915.
The Allies and the Central Powers assumed that Italian
favors were up for auction. The German General Staff, already alarmed
by Austria's inability to make headway against the Russians on the Carpathian
front, feared that Italian intervention would be followed by intervention
on the part of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, and that, at the very
least, this would require a substantial diversion of German troops from
the French and Russian theaters. German military and civilian authorities
consequently bent every effort to persuade the Austrians to offer concessions
to Italy. They encountered strong resistance in Vienna. When Austrian
Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Berchtold agreed to contemplate such
a policy, he was ousted by intran
sigents in the imperial government and replaced in January 1915 by one
of their own number, Count Stefan Burian von Rajecz. But even Burian
was compelled eventually to yield ground. The German government dispatched
former Chancellor Prince Bernhard von Billow as a special ambassador
to Rome, and he was presently authorized to offer the Italians territory
from the Austrian borderlands as well as promises of economic concessions
and future grants from the British and French empires. He also encouraged
neutralist journalists and entered into secret conversations with Giolitti.
Another special German envoy, Roman Catholic Center Party leaders Matthias
Erzberger, meanwhile appealed to Pope Benedict XV and to Italian Roman
Catholics to help keep Italy out of the war.
The Allies were no less active. They subsidized journalists
who advocated intervention on their side; one was the editor of the
Socialist Avanti, Benito Mussolini. Their diplomats warned the Italian
government that the Central Powers were not to be trusted and hinted
that intervention on the Allied side would bring Italy large pieces
of Austrian territory and a dominant position in the Adriatic Sea. The
British and French were compelled at first to be vague in their promises,
for the Russian government backed Serbia's ambition for a great Yugoslavia
and insisted that Serbia had first claim on the Allies. Planning for
their attack on the Dardanelles early in 1915, however, the British
became more and more convinced that Italian intervention was urgent;
they threatened the Russians with possible curtailment of financial
and other aid. Czar Nicholas II'sministers gave in. As a result, the
three Allies were able to sign with Italy on April 26, 1915, the secret
Treaty of London. By its terms, Italy was to enter the war on the Allied
side and be rewarded subsequently with the Trentino; the Tirol to the
Brenner Pass; Trieste; Gorz (Gorizia) ; Gra'disca; the Istrian Peninsula
and adjoining islands; Dalmatia; such ports on the Adriatic coast as
were not already assigned to Montenegro or Serbia; control over the
foreign relations of Albania; recognized sovereignty over the Dodecanese,
which Italy had occupied since 1912; the province of Antalya (Adalia)
in Turkey, when and if Turkey were partitioned; and shares in the indemnity
imposed on the Central Powers and in any African colonial spoils.
Salandra had decided in February to negotiate such a
treaty. Nevertheless, he had continued through March and April to discuss
possible terms with the Central Powers, constantly increasing his demands
as the Germans and Austrians appeared to yield. Then, on May 3, 1915,
he showed his hand. He formally denounced the Triple Alliance and notified
Berlin and Vienna that Italy was regaining her freedom of action. On
May 13, having failed to obtain unanimous support from his cabinet for
intervention, he resigned. Giolitti refused to take power, however,
and chauvinists led by the poet Gabriele d'Annunzio clamored for war.
On May 16, the king advised Salandra that he could not accept the resignation;
Salandra resumed office; and on May 23, the Italian government formally
declared war on Austria-Hungary. Subsequently, on November 30, it proclaimed
its adhesion to the Pact of London. Italy had joined Britain, France,
Russia, and Japan as one of the great Allies.
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